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ABSTRACT 
Public recognition of the value of wetlands has risen quickly over the past 25 
years and numerous policies and programs have been developed to address threats to 
the quantity and quality of wetlands. However, management of wetland resources 
located on private land often involves a perceived conflict between social and private 
interests since landowners usually cannot benefit economically from keeping wetlands 
on site unless they convert them to alternative uses such as agricultural crops. In order 
to avoid further degradation and ensure the various environmental benefits wetlands 
provide, there is a need for government intervention by delivering effective policies. 
This will be realized through an effective economic valuation process for wetland 
benefits. 
This thesis investigates wetland and riparian zones management, with greater 
emphasis placed on the Prairie Pothole Region (PPR) of Saskatchewan where the 
majority of the land is privately owned. Using data from a survey of landowners, the 
perceived cost of conserving wetland and associated riparian zones is quantified 
through their willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for a proposed 10-year 
economic incentive-based program. In addition, the role of landowner and farm 
characteristics on this perceived cost of conservation has also been assessed. As 
indicated by the results from two probit models that were developed, per acre payment 
has a significant positive effect on the probability a landowner will accept the program 
offer; the average payment respondents required being $32.58/acre. Other factors such 
as the landowner’s previous experience dealing with the wetland, personal preferences 
correlated with economic benefits and landowners who have an heir to take over the 
farm are also found to have significant impact on their participation decision. For those 
respondents who did not complete the WTA question, past relative experience, 
knowledge about wetlands, age, and the agricultural region the farm is located are 
revealed to be factors that affect to the provision of an explicit answer. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background Information 
Agriculture has been defined as the production of food, fiber and other goods 
by the systematic raising of plants and animals. Agriculture provides a wide variety of 
commodities that are exchanged in economic markets but also interacts with the 
natural environment in positive and negative ways to produce a range of environmental 
amenities and disamenities. On the positive side, farming has contributed to creating 
and maintaining a variety of valuable environmental products such as biological 
diversity, bioenergy, open space and scenic vistas (Devries, 2000). In addition, 
agriculture supports diverse rural communities that is not only a fundamental asset of a 
country’s culture, but also plays an essential role in maintaining the environment in a 
healthy state (European Commission, 2003). On the negative side, agriculture can be a 
major contributor to environmental problems such as degradation of natural lands, 
water quality and critical habitat loss. For example, surface run-off from farmland 
including dissolved chemicals like nitrogen fertilizers and soluble pesticide can impair 
drinking water quality and degrade habitat for aquatic organisms, affecting recreational 
use of streams, lakes and reservoirs (Bernstein, Cooper and Claassen, 2004). Bacterial 
contamination from animal wastes decrease drinking water quality and decrease the 
quality of life in residential areas (Lichtenberg, 2000). Soil erosion from farmland 
affects the productivity of agricultural land and the quality of natural environment 
since eroded soil can clog estuaries, streams and lakes, resulting in increased flooding 
and destruction of habitats for many species (Lichtenberg, 2000).  
Wetlands are a particularly productive ecosystem providing a wide range of 
environmental goods. However, wetlands and adjoining riparian zones located within 
agricultural landscapes can be negatively impacted by farming activities. One of the 
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primary direct impacts is through the conversion of wetland areas to the production of 
annual crops. Although wetlands are one of the most productive natural systems on 
earth and perform a variety of useful functions (Crosson and Frederick, 1999), they 
have been extensively degraded through physical and functional human activities over 
the last decades. For most of Canada’s history, wetlands were perceived as wastelands 
and a nuisance, impeding residential development and reducing the land available for 
agriculture (Carriker, 1994). Therefore, despite the vital role wetlands play in 
ecosystems, they are disappearing rapidly. In the U.S., according to Blackwell (1995), 
approximately 215 million acres of wetlands existed in the United States at the time of 
European settlement. However, nine states experienced a 70 percent or greater loss in 
wetland extent since 1780, and nine more lost more than 50 percent of original 
wetlands. “Between 1954 and 1974, the net rate of wetland conversion averaged 
457,600 acres per year, with 81 percent of gross wetland conversion to agricultural 
uses and 8 percent to urban” (Anderson and Magleby, 1997). By the middle 1970s less 
than half of original wetlands remained. In Canada, over 14 percent of wetland areas 
that existed before the time of European settlement have now been greatly transformed 
(Wiken et al, 2003). It is estimated that over 20 million hectares of wetlands have been 
converted to agricultural production since European settlement (Natural Resources 
Canada, 2004). Wetland losses are estimated to be around 65 percent in the coastal 
marshes of Atlantic Canada, 70 percent in southern Ontario, 71 percent in the Prairies, 
and 80 percent of the Fraser River Delta in British Columbia (Wiken et al., 2003). 
These areas generally coincide with the denser concentrations of people and human 
settlements. 
In order to understand the issues surrounding wetland degradation on 
agricultural lands, it is important to effectively define “wetland”. Wetlands have been 
defined differently by scientists, policymakers and natural resource agencies in several 
countries. Since 1977, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) has defined wetlands 
as “areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and 
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a 
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prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions” 
(Anderson and Magleby, 1997). According to The Canadian Wetland Classification 
System published by the National Wetlands Working Group of the Canada Committee 
on Ecological Land Classification (1988), wetland is given a similar but not identical 
definition as “land that is saturated with water long enough to promote wetland or 
aquatic processes as indicated by poorly drained soils, hydrophytic vegetation and 
various kinds of biological activity which are adapted to a wet environment.” Ramsar 
convention, an intergovernmental treaty adopted in 1971 in the Iranian city of Ramsar, 
has promoted an agreed definition of wetland as follows:  
“areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, 
permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, 
including areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six 
metres” (Ramsar Information Bureau, 1998). 
In addition, in order to protect coherent sites, Ramsar provides definition of 
wetlands beyond what are actually wetlands as supplement as to: 
“incorporate riparian and coastal zones adjacent to the wetlands, and islands 
or bodies of marine water deeper than six metres at low tide lying within the wetlands” 
(Ramsar Information Bureau, 1998). 
The above definitions of wetland are very broad in the light of different areas 
of expertise and interest. However most of the current definitions are largely based on 
the biological principles and all include water, soil and vegetation as the three most 
important features of wetland and the associated riparian areas (Heimlich et al, 1998).    
       In recent years, society, scientists and policy makers have recognized the wide 
range of environmental benefits provided by wetlands. Although water is the defining 
feature, wetlands are important elements of the ecosystem and much more than just 
water. They promote and support the growth of aquatic plants and animals for part of 
their life cycle (Huel, 2000) and are performing such essential functions as important 
carbon sinks that could “sequester additional carbon from the atmosphere in form of 
soil organic matter” (Mitra, Wassmann and Vlek, 2003). They also provide other 
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benefits such as preserving water quality, controlling sediments, preventing erosion, 
reducing intensity of flooding, buffering the effects of storms and providing 
aesthetically pleasing open space and recreational sites (Gelso et al. 2008).  
As the transition zones between the upland and aquatic ecosystems, riparian 
zones are the most effective protection for water source and support wetland functions 
in various ways. Although riparian areas comprise only 1-2 percent of the total land 
base of the Prairies, they provide a range of important environmental and economic 
benefits and services (AAFC, 2004). These strips of trees, shrubs and native grasses 
along the banks of creeks, streams and rivers could improve water quality by filtering 
polluted runoff before they reach the surface water (Connecticut River Joint 
Commissions, 2000). Protecting riparian buffers will in turn better help protect the 
function of wetlands.  
The wide range of environmental amenities provided by wetland and riparian 
zones affect society in different ways and have much social benefits for those involved 
in agriculture. As an incentive to reduce both the onsite and offsite environmental 
impacts of farming on wetlands and riparian areas, governments of many countries 
have developed a broad range of wetland conservation policies and programs to 
address the loss of wetlands from agricultural landscapes at national, state, provincial 
and local levels. Most countries have implemented both wetland specific policies and 
broader agricultural and land use policies that influence management decisions 
(Farnese and Belcher, 2006).  
At a global scale, there are many international agreements that are at least 
partially aimed at wetland conservation such as the first modern intergovernmental 
treaty Ramsar and another multilateral environmental agreement, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). Canada, as a large wetland holder in the world, has 
broadly committed itself to conserve wetland in a number of international agreements 
including both Ramsar Convention and CBD as described above. In addition, Canada 
has also developed many national discussion and fact sheets on wetland issues 
identifying and addressing major problems existing such as the Federal Policy on 
 5 
Wetland Conservation (FPWC) and Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. At a 
regional scale, many provinces have also developed their own wetland policies and 
legislation. Ontario’s primary method of wetland protection comes via the Provincial 
Policy Statement under the Planning Act and the Great Lakes Wetlands Conservation 
Plan (GLWCAP) (Rubec and Hanson, 2008; Environment Canada, 2008). In Atlantic 
Canada, the main policy for wetlands development in Prince Edward Island are The 
Wetland Conservation Policy for Prince Edward Island (WCP-PEI) which was 
introduced in 2003; wetlands in Nova Scotia are managed primarily by its Environment 
Act of 1994-1995 (2006) and Wetland Designation Policy; the 2002 New Brunswick 
Wetland Conservation Policy (NBWCP) has outlined New Brunswick wetlands 
conservation objectives and means to achieve them (Rubec and Hanson, 2008). In 
prairie regions, the Water for Life strategy that was adopted by the Alberta provincial 
government in 2003 outlines the basic policy foundation for sustainable wetlands 
management and supply. The report, with recommendations for the renewal of this 
strategy, was released by Alberta Water Council in January 2008 (Alberta Water 
Council, 2008). Manitoba developed the Manitoba’s Water Policies in 1990 and in 
2007, the mandate and the members of the new Manitoba Water Council were 
announced to provide various stakeholders with watershed management plans 
(Manitoba Wildlands, 2008). Saskatchewan, our study area, produced its 
Saskatchewan Wetland Policy in 1995. This policy is currently under revision by 
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority (SWA) to target increased efforts at wetland 
retention and provide guidance to drainage policy on privately owned lands (SWA, 
2007).  
In general, current public policies implemented on wetlands have largely 
focused on mitigating the over-exploitation of wetlands and riparian areas rather than 
balance the public's interest in conserving wetlands and landowners' interests in 
converting to the production of commodities. In fact, one of the primary explanations 
for wetland degradation is the lack of motivation of landowners to provide the 
environmental goods wetlands produce. Although wetlands and associated riparian 
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zones perform a variety of functions that benefit the public, the actual value of these 
goods and services is not priced properly by the free market. Most of these public 
goods produce “benefits that accrue to society at large or to individuals other than the 
wetland owners” (Heimlich et al, 1998). Therefore private owners of wetlands are not 
able to profit from these wetlands and there is an incentive for them to convert 
wetlands to the production of market commodities, such as agriculture or urban 
development even though such conversion can be costly to society (Heimlich et al, 
1998). We usually define this situation in economic theory as a “market failure” which 
would result in a suboptimal allocation of wetlands being conserved from a social 
perspective. In such cases, there is an economic rationale for governments to 
encourage political programs to correct the market failure so as to better protect 
wetlands within the private agriculture land (Bernstein et al. 2004).  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Currently the environmental goods produced by wetlands on private 
agricultural land are provided at a suboptimal level from the social perspective. In 
order to avoid further degradation activities, increase the supply of wetlands and 
achieve the socially efficient stock, there is a need for government intervention through 
delivering effective policy, namely economic incentive-based program. This will be 
realized by effectively quantifying the cost of landowner adoption of farm 
management plans that conserve and enhance healthy functioning riparian and wetland 
areas, and by investigating various attributes’ impacts on individual landowner’s 
preservation choices.   
1.3 Objectives 
The primary objective of this research is to quantify landowners’ perceived 
cost of conserving wetland and riparian zones and to evaluate the role of landowner 
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and farm characteristics on this perceived cost of conservation. The specific objectives 
of this research are: 
1) To evaluate international and national wetlands conservation policies to understand 
the primary policy tools used to provide wetland and riparian environmental goods 
on agricultural landscapes. 
2) Estimate the financial incentive required for landowners to conserve wetland and 
riparian zones on their land within two study areas in Saskatchewan. 
3) Assess the influence of farm and landowner characteristics on the magnitude of the 
economic incentive required. 
4) Develop policy recommendations relevant to the study area farm and wetland and 
riparian zone characteristics. 
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
The current research is part of broader interdisciplinary research project 
entitled “Economics, Greenhouse Gas and Policy Implications of Wetland and 
Riparian Management on an Agricultural Landscape” which is directed by Ducks 
Unlimited Canada in conjunction with Advancing Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food 
(ACAAF). The data information from a mail-out survey which was conducted for this 
research was also used by Cuddington (2008) which focused on land use allocation 
and management of wetlands in the PPR, and the role of carbon markets in assisting 
publicly funded wetland conservation programs.  
This thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 presents an 
overview of the status of natural resources and a policy background regarding wetlands 
and riparian areas within agricultural landscapes, particularly in Canada. The chapter 
begins with a brief introduction of wetlands and riparian zones, their values and threats 
to them. The current policies for wetland protection and development are reviewed 
through the relevant literature. The chapter concludes by examining the market and 
non-market valuation mechanisms for valuing wetlands. 
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The theoretical framework utilized in this research is elaborated in chapter 3. 
In this chapter why a “market failure” may occur with respect to wetland outputs and 
how it would affect distribution of land use in privately owned agricultural landscape 
have been identified. With the help of a graphic model, the role of a financial incentive 
as a policy tool to encourage conservation of wetlands is examined as a solution to this 
problem. 
Chapter 4 contains the geological and biological information of the two 
research areas and the description of data collected. The explanation of the 
econometric model applied for the empirical work of this analysis is also included in 
this chapter. 
Chapter 5 presents a description of explanatory variables adopted as well as 
their expected influence. The results for the empirical work for this analysis are then 
provided, along with a discussion of significant variables. In this chapter it is shown 
how landowners’ characteristics influence participation in wetland conservation 
programs and the amount of economic incentive required. 
Lastly, chapter 6 summarizes the results of the thesis and offers the limitation 
of the study. Topics for future research are suggested. 
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CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Wetlands and riparian areas are vital in supporting people’s life in that they 
supply a range of environmental benefits. However, historically, wetlands were 
considered a health hazard and were largely altered for other uses. The conversion 
actions have lasted for quite a long time in human history with financial and political 
encouragement, until in recent decades increased recognition of the value of wetlands 
and associated riparian areas, public opinions and wetland policies began to shift from 
exploitation to preservation and restoration. Preventing further wetland degradation 
and improving wetland stock have become the primary objectives of current wetland 
policies. With the purpose to deliver efficient policy for mitigating the impacts of 
human production activities on wetlands and increase wetland supply, valuation of 
economic costs and benefits of wetlands is necessary. The valuation can help examine 
public’s values of wetland good and services and explore the appropriate policy for 
landowners to conserve wetland. 
This chapter starts with an introduction of the basic background of wetlands 
concerning their values and status. A review of various wetland policies implemented 
in various countries and regions is then presented. Approaches taken in EU and US are 
discussed for comparison purpose. The chapter concludes with an examination of 
existing wetland valuation methods.  
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2.2 Environmental Goods in Agricultural Landscapes 
2.2.1 Agriculture and Environment 
Farming is an activity whose significance goes beyond simple food 
production and food and fibre commodities but also inevitably depends in major ways 
upon the natural environment and can exert a profound influence over it. Specifically, 
on one side, many valuable habitats are maintained by extensive farming operations 
and a wide range of wild species rely on farming for their survival. On the other side, 
intensive agricultural practices, in many situations, can also have an adverse impact on 
natural environmental resources (European Commission, 2003). According to a 
general state assessment of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2000, 
agriculture is the leading source of pollution in 48 percent of river miles and 41 
percent of lake acres (excluding the Great Lakes) and a major source of impairment in 
18 percent of estuarine waters in United States in that they do not support designated 
uses (Wiebe and Gollehon, 2006). As the intensity of agricultural production has 
increased in recent decades, the impact on the natural environment throughout the 
production chain has become increasingly apparent. The economy is gradually 
damaging the surrounding environmental foundation on which it rests. All the natural 
resources may simultaneously affect environmental spillovers from agriculture 
production like soil and water pollution, pesticide poisonings, fragmentation of habits, 
loss of wildlife and environmental degradation as a result (Lichtenberg, 2000). 
Wetlands and corresponding riparian buffer zones are an example of the environmental 
resources that are suffering the impacts that come from farming activities. The 
following sections will first review the status of the remaining wetlands and then 
examine the functions and benefits of wetlands and riparian zones. 
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2.2.2 Status and Functions of Wetland and Riparian Zones   
2.2.2.1 Wetland Status 
Wetlands play a vital role in the global environment as sources of biological, 
cultural and economic diversity. Wetlands can be found in all climate zones from the 
tropics to the tundra regions (Mitra et al. 2003). However, an accurate assessment of 
the size and distribution of the global wetland resources is not available due to their 
scattered nature. As reported by Ramsar, the UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre has estimated there are about 570 million hectares of wetlands (5.7 million 
square kilometres) – roughly 6 percent of the Earth’s land surface – of which 2 percent 
are lakes, 30 percent bogs, 26 percent fens, 20 percent swamps, and 15 percent 
floodplains (Ramsar Information Bureau, 2007a). Mitsch and Gosselink’s standard text 
book Wetlands, 3rd edition (2000) has suggested that 4 percent to 6 percent of the 
Earth’s land surface is wetland (as cited in Ramsar Information Bureau, 2007a).  
As indicated by the definitions presented in the first chapter, wetlands are 
neither entirely land nor entirely water. They may be covered or saturated with water 
throughout the year or partially or completely dry for months (Crosson and Frederick, 
1999). The Ramsar convention divides wetlands into 3 major categories to provide a 
very broad framework and to aid rapid identification of the main wetland habitats 
represented at each site (Ramsar Information Bureau, 2007a). These three types are: 
Marine/Coastal Wetlands, including coastal lagoons, rocky shores, and coral reefs, 
Inland Wetlands, including inland deltas, waterfalls and mangrove swamps and 
human-made wetlands, including fish and shrimp ponds, farm ponds, irrigated 
agricultural land and reservoirs). With the help of this broad classification system, the 
types of those globally threatened wetlands and those wetlands that are 
under-represented in the List of Wetlands of International Importance can be easily 
identified by the convention (Mitra et al. 2003).  
In Canada, wetlands, which occur all over its land mass, are typically the 
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biological reservoirs in grassland, forested, arctic landscapes and coastal areas, hosting 
and sustaining many of the country’s natural assets such as plants, birds, insects, and 
mammals (Wiken et al, 2003). According to Wiken et al, as reported by National 
Wetlands Working Group, being a large holder of wetlands, Canada possesses an 
estimated 24 percent of all wetlands in the entire world. More than 1.6 million square 
kilometers of wetlands are located in Canada and comprise about 18 percent of 
Canada's total land area distributed among 15 terrestrial ecozones (Wiken et al, 1996). 
The distribution of wetlands varies greatly across Canada but most of the wetlands are 
located in Manitoba and Ontario. The largest concentrations of wetlands are in the 
Boreal Shield, Boreal Plains, Hudson Plains and Taiga Plains. Figure 2.1 (Wiken et al, 
2003) shows the distribution and relative percentages of wetlands based on the 
ecozones of Canada. The darker lines in the figure show the larger ecozone boundaries. 
Based on the above national wetland situation, a national framework presenting 
standardized criteria and definitions, The Canadian Wetland Classification System, 
classifies Canadian wetlands into three hierarchical levels: (1) class – based on the 
overall genesis of the wetland ecosystem, (2) form – based on the surface morphology 
and pattern, landscape setting, water type and morphology of underlying mineral, and 
(3) type – based on the vegetation physiognomy (Government of Canada, 1991).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Figure 2.1 Percentage of land cover represented by wetlands   
Source: Wiken et al. (2003): Figure 1   
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The province of Saskatchewan contains approximately 11 percent of Canada’s 
total wetlands (Huel, 2000). Although wetland numbers and size are not constant 
through the year and often change with the climate, “it is estimated there are about 1.5 
million wetlands covering 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres) in the agricultural 
region of the province” (Huel, 2000). Most Saskatchewan wetlands are small although 
the number is considerable. “Over 80 percent of the province’s wetlands cover less 
than one hectare and less than one quarter of one percent of Saskatchewan wetlands 
are greater than 50 hectares in size” (Huel, 2000). A more detailed discussion of 
Saskatchewan wetlands will be provided in Chapter 4. 
Many wetland functions are also dependent on the riparian areas (Connecticut 
River Joint Commissions, 2000). Riparian buffers, which are described as “green 
ribbons of lush vegetation”, are often interpreted as the interface between human land 
use and a water body. Riparian areas are often narrow bands located between the 
wetland basin and the surrounding upland area and form a small proportion of the 
landscape. However, they are significant in ecology, environmental management and 
civil engineering due to their role in soil conservation, biodiversity support and the 
influence on aquatic ecosystems (Farnese and Belcher, 2006). On the Prairies, the 
increased moisture found in these areas produces unique plant communities that differ 
noticeably from surrounding crop and pasture land (AAFC, 2004). They protect 
aquatic environments from excessive sedimentation, reduce the amount of nutrients, 
chemicals and pathogens reaching the wetland, assist in recharging aquifers and supply 
shelter and food for many aquatic animals. For wetland conservation policy to meet 
objectives of particular ecological functions, it will be essential for the riparian zones 
and not just the wetland basins to be conserved (Farnese and Belcher, 2006).  
2.2.2.2 Benefit of Wetlands and Riparian Zones 
Wetlands are a vital element of the national and global environment and 
provide a number of useful ecological and economic functions and services to society 
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(Table 2.1). These functions and services can be divided into two categories: use value 
and non-use value. Typically, “use” value refers to values stemming from situations 
where people have direct interaction with the resource while “non-use” value is not 
related to the actual use of the resource. Further, use value could be grouped according 
to whether they are direct or indirect, marketable or non-marketable (Huel, 2000; Mitra 
et al. 2003, Barbier, Acreman and Knowler, 1997; Cuddington, 2008).  
The crucial role riparian areas play in the environment cannot be neglected 
when we discuss the various roles provided by wetlands. These buffers are complex 
ecosystems that supply habitat and improve the wetland communities they border and 
buffer. Environmental benefits provided by riparian zones include: a) filter sediments 
-approximately 50-100 percent of the sediments being transported from adjacent 
upland areas could be settled out depending on the width and complexity of the buffer; 
b) assist wetlands in slowing the velocity of the runoff water; c) provide aesthetics 
value with green screen along waterways (Connecticut River Joint Commissions, 
2000). Economic benefits provided by riparian zones include adding fertility to soils, 
providing carbon sequestration and supplying forage and high quality water for 
livestock. With good management of riparian buffer zones, livestock producers could 
earn stable incomes from increased forage productivity (AAFC, 2004). 
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Table 2.1 Classification of economic wetland benefits 
Benefit Class Benefit Category Wetland Benefits Explanation 
Use value Direct Use 
Market 
Transportation 
Drinking water 
Irrigation 
Electricity 
Carbon sequestration 
Wetlands provide an array of basic 
services to the society that is close to 
people’s daily life. These services could 
be priced and traded in the open market. 
 Direct Use 
Non-market 
Recreation 
Aesthetic 
Wetlands have special attributes to 
outdoor recreations such as fishing, 
hunting, boating, bird-watching and 
canoeing. Besides, wetlands produce 
timber and grazing area for livestock, 
constitute a source of aesthetic inspiration, 
support educational and scientific 
activities and form the basis of important 
local traditions. 
 Indirect Use 
Non-market 
Water storage The water storage capacity of wetlands 
can help to receive and store surplus water 
flows after a storm by slowing the 
movement of water into tributary streams, 
thus allowing potential floodwaters to 
reach rivers over a longer period of time. 
Shoreline protection Healthy vegetation found in wetland along 
the coast and shorelines helps to stabilize 
shoreline from wave damage and erosion. 
Wildlife support The lush growth of wetlands provides the 
energy to maintain complex food chains 
and supports literally hundreds of species 
of insects, birds, mammals, fish, 
amphibians, reptiles, and other creatures 
large and small by habitat and food 
supply. 
Climate impacts Wetlands are an important source of 
oxygen and a vital element of the natural 
evapotranspiration. They are able to return 
over two-thirds of their annual water 
inputs to the atmosphere through plant 
evaporation. 
Non-Use value Non-market Existence value 
Bequest value 
An intrinsic value people place on the 
wetland independent of its actual use 
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2.2.3 Threats to Wetlands 
2.2.3.1 Wetlands at Risk 
Despite the fact that wetlands and the associated riparian areas are vital to the 
ecosystem and the important multiple values they provide to humanity, wetlands are 
disappearing rapidly and continue to be among the world’s most threatened ecosystems. 
Human activities cause wetland degradation and loss in many ways such as ongoing 
drainage, conversion, pollution, and over-exploitation of the resources (Heimlich et al, 
1998; Natural Resources Canada, 2004; Huel, 2000). As examined by Crosson and 
Frederick (1999):  
...draining and protecting lands from floods for farming, mining, forestry, urban 
development, and highway construction may eliminate the water essential to the 
existence of a wetland. Changes in the landscape associated with these activities 
may result in erosion that degrades or destroys wetlands. Dam and reservoir 
construction, channelization and dredging for navigation, reservoir management, 
water diversions, drainage, and discharges of used water are likely to alter the 
quantity, quality, or timing of flows for wetlands.  
Over the last 100 years, it is estimated that half of the world’s wetlands have been 
destroyed due to human overuse or conversion activities (WWF, 2008). Conversion of 
swamps, marshes, lakes and floodplains for agriculture, housing and industrial 
schemes has led to dramatic alterations of wetlands landscapes and ecosystem 
functioning (WWF, 2008).  
During most of the past century in Canada, the country’s national biodiversity 
did not attract enough attention except in the sense of harvesting products such as furs, 
timber and fish. In order to reach urban development goals, grasslands and wetlands 
have often been considered as obstacles that need to be transformed. Especially in the 
southern prairie area, around the lower Great Lakes and along the St. Lawrence 
Lowlands, many of the productive wetlands have been exploited (Wiken et al, 2003). It 
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is estimated that about 20 million hectares, about 85 percent of the total wetland loss, 
have been destroyed due to agriculture development since the early 1800’s (Wiken et 
al, 2003). Other factors also contribute to wetland degradation including recreational 
development, hydro development, lake-level management, and drainage for forestry 
and peat harvesting. These losses are in the most productive ecozones – the Prairies 
Ecozone and the Mixed Wood Plains Ecozone (Wiken et al, 2003). Figure 2.2 (Natural 
Resources Canada, 2004) provides a general idea of wetlands at risk in Canada. This 
map indicates that wetlands near urban areas are under the greatest pressure but are the 
most valued areas for educational or recreational purposes. 
 
Figure 2.2 Wetlands at risk     
  Source: Natural Resource Canada (2004) 
 
In Saskatchewan, the area of highest historic wetland density, the prairie 
pothole region (PPR), coincides with areas of intensive agricultural production. As a 
result, agricultural activities have had the largest impact on Saskatchewan wetlands. 
Since wetlands compete with cropland acreage, decrease efficiency of field operations 
and may contribute to crop depredation by waterfowl, which can occasionally be 
numerous, draining and converting wetlands to crop production continues to be the 
most serious threat facing Saskatchewan wetlands (Wylynko, 1999; Huel, 2000). 
2.2.3.2 The Role of Policy in Wetland Loss 
       Governmental policies used to play an important role promoting North 
   High  
    Moderate 
   Low 
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American wetland degradation and conversion by implementing drainage 
encouragement programs. Within the United States’, from the mid-1950s until the 
1970s, wetland drainage and cultivation activities were supported by direct and 
indirect agricultural policies. In the 1600s, the United States possessed more than 200 
million acres of wetlands in the lower 48 states (EPA, 2001). Since then, extensive 
losses have occurred, and more than half of the original wetlands have been drained 
and converted to other uses with the explicit encouragement of federal government 
policies and local cooperative efforts. Between 1954 and 1974, the net rate of wetland 
conversion averaged 457,600 acres per year, with 81 percent of gross wetlands 
conversion to agricultural uses and 8 percent to urban (Anderson and Magleby, 1997). 
The drainage focus also shifted from the Midwest to the Delta and Gulf region and the 
southeast (Heimlich et al, 1998). For a long period of time (from the mid-1950s to 
1983), agriculture was the major cause of wetland losses in the 48 states because 
federal government policies, throughout the country's history, provided incentives to 
landowners to convert wetlands to crop and animal production by directly or indirectly 
making it profitable to do so (Crosson and Frederick, 1999). Agriculture has accounted 
for 53 percent of the gross conversion during that period of time and then dropped to 
20 percent of the total wetland conversion between 1982 and 1992 (Anderson and 
Magleby, 1997). Since then, with significant changes in existing policy and the 
development and implementation of new policies, the rate of loss has slowed in the 
U.S. 
       Canadian wetland conversion has followed a similar pattern to what has 
occurred in the U.S. To enable agricultural development in many areas, much of the 
grassland and wetland area was transformed to agricultural production to provide 
agricultural commodities. For example, during the three decades after the Second 
World War, wetland loss was encouraged through burning, draining and conversion to 
agricultural use to meet an increasing international need for grains and oilseeds. The 
objective of agricultural policies in this period of time was to eliminate these marginal 
lands as policy makers did not recognize the impact the programs initiatives had on the 
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Canadian landscape. Subsequently this form of wetland management was considered 
as a unsustainable land use. Working in cooperation with federal and provincial 
agricultural departments, and other agricultural and conservation organizations, 
acceptable methods of modifying policies have gradually been developed (Cox, 1993). 
2.3 Wetland and Riparian Policy Overview 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Public recognition of the value of wetlands has risen quickly over the past 25 
years (Heimlich et al, 1998). Society has realized the serious results of wetlands 
overexploitation and also the valuable functions and services provided by wetlands. 
Numerous policies and programs have been developed to decrease these impacts on 
the quantity and quality improvement of wetland resources to prevent further loss and 
increase stock. Both national action and international cooperation have been 
encouraged to provide a variety of mitigation measures and wise use of wetlands and 
their resources (Mitra et al. 2003).  
One approach to address wetland loss is wetland mitigation policy. Usually 
mitigation policy could be outlined as a three-step process: 1) avoidance; 2) 
minimization; and 3) compensation (Lynch-Stewart et al. 1996; Grose and Cox, 2000; 
Rubec and Hanson, 2008). The definition of this mitigation hierarchy reflects a 
philosophical procedure to achieve wetland conservation goals. As the first step of a 
mitigation effort, avoidance is the first-best approach to conserve wetlands since it 
involves prevention and will save development costs involved for subsequent 
minimization and compensation practices; minimization activity occurs when wetlands 
conversion has to take place and efforts are applied to reduce adverse effects to the 
lowest level; compensation acts as a makeup measure to offset any unavoidable and 
undiminished damages to wetland functions and typically includes restoration and 
enhancement (Lynch-Stewart et al. 1996). Although compensation is the last step of 
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the mitigation process, it plays an essential role in conserving wetlands due to the 
insufficient effort of avoidance and minimization in reducing loss. Compensation 
deters the impact of wetland loss on society and also insures the achievement of 
avoidance and minimization.  
In order to meet wetland mitigation and compensation objectives, policy 
makers have established a wide variety of policies and regulations. Policies for 
conserving wetlands can include direct to indirect and voluntary to involuntary, for 
example education and technical assistance, financial incentive, command regulations 
and pollution tax, trying to head off the risks of environmental degradation while still 
encouraging landowners to continue to play a positive role in the maintenance of the 
countryside and the environment (European Commission, 2003; Claassen et al. 2001). 
Each policy tool has different characteristics. The use of a completely voluntary 
program (e.g. education, research and technical assistance etc.) is often regarded as 
helpful in improving landowners’ awareness of benefits of conservation plans but the 
effectiveness is very uncertain due to voluntary participation rate and uncertain 
benefits landowners get from programs (Claassen et al. 2001). Direct compulsory 
regulations (pollution tax, environmental law, corporate law etc.) can be effective in 
ensuring participation and improving environmental quality but have been largely 
avoided due to low flexibility and high costs associated with enforcement (Claassen et 
al. 2001; Cuddington, 2008). Incentive payment programs (cost-share programs, land 
retirement programs, environmental tax, etc.), increase the probability landowners 
adopt the environmentally desirable practices relative to information programs while at 
the same time allow greater flexibility than regulatory approaches and may represent a 
more realistic tool to realize wetland conservation goal (Claassen et al. 2001).  
Despite the apparent effectiveness of economic incentives in encouraging 
landowners to take part in wetland provision programs, the optimum social 
conservation goal may not be realized through a single policy mechanism (Cuddington, 
2008). For example, compulsory regulations may still be necessary to eliminate high 
environmental risk activities and knowledge improvement programs are essential to 
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assist landowners to make rational decisions. It can be argued that well-integrated 
mandatory and voluntary policy may enable incentive-based economic plans to 
achieve the best result of wetland loss prevention and lost wetland function 
replacement.  
When designing a wetland policy, another important factor environmental 
managers and decision makers need to consider is the cost-effectiveness of 
management practices. Since public funding is limited, policy should be designed to 
find the least cost way to meet the defined environmental benefits objectives 
(Cuddington, 2008). This will be based on a full understanding and an effective 
economic valuation of the goods and services provided by wetlands. This discussion is 
included later in this chapter in section 2.4. 
The remainder of this section is focused on regulations and policies that 
govern wetlands across the world. Whether these policies are successful should not 
only be judged by the enforcement results and capability in meeting planned objectives 
but also by their flexibility and cost-effectiveness. International agreements are first 
introduced, followed by regional ones. 
2.3.2 International Agreements on Wetland 
In terms of global wetland policy, the Ramsar Convention that was signed on 
February 2, 1971, in the Iranian city of Ramsar, is an intergovernmental treaty 
addressing wetland conservation. The goal of the Ramsar Convention, as adopted by 
the Parties in 1999 and refined in 2002, is “the conservation and wise use of all 
wetlands through local, regional and national actions and international cooperation, as 
a contribution towards achieving sustainable development throughout the world.” 
(Ramsar, 2007). In 1987, during the Ramsar meeting of the Conference of the 
Contracting Parties in Regina, the concept of wise use and sustainable development of 
wetlands were defined as follows (Ramsar Convention Secretariat, 2007):  
“The ‘wise use’ of wetlands is their sustainable utilization for the benefit of 
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mankind in a way compatible with the maintenance of the natural properties of the 
ecosystem, and ‘sustainable development’ of a wetlands refers to development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs.”  
Further wise use as a sustainable development mechanism has subsequently been 
recognized by the Ramsar Convention in 1996 through its adoption of the 
Convention’s mission statement, in the Strategic Plan 1997-2002, and reaffirmed by 
this amended mission statement in the Strategic Plan 2003-2008 as (Ramsar 
Convention Secretariat, 2007):  
“the conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local, regional and 
national actions and international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving 
sustainable development throughout the world.” 
The provisions of Ramsar are relatively straightforward and general. Over the 
years, the Conference of the Contracting Parties has further developed and interpreted 
the basic tenets of the treaty text and succeeded in keeping the work of the Convention 
abreast of changing world perceptions, priorities, and trends in environmental thinking 
(Ramsar Information Bureau, 2007b). There are presently 159 Contracting Parties to 
the Convention, with 1838 wetland sites, totaling 161 million hectares, designated for 
inclusion in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar, 2009a).        
       Another multilateral environmental agreement relevant to wetland 
conservation is the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), signed in 1992 at the 
Rio Earth Summit by 150 leaders from participating countries. This international 
agreement is dedicated to the promotion of sustainable development and is also a 
significant document for the purpose of wetland conservation (Farnese and Belcher, 
2006). The three main objectives of this convention are to conserve biodiversity, to 
enhance the sustainable use of the components, and to ensure fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits arising from genetic resources (CBD, 2008a).  
As a natural major carbon sink, wetlands perform an important role in 
sequestering carbon from the atmosphere. The Kyoto Protocol is an international 
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agreement adopted at the third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 3) in 
Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 with the objective of reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) that causes climate change (UNFCCC, 2008). Under this protocol, 
industrialized countries are required to reduce GHG such as carbon dioxide, nitrous 
oxide and methane by a collective average of 5 percent below their 1990 levels by the 
commitment period of 2008-2012.  
      In North America, the North American Waterfowl Management Plan 
(NAWMP) was developed by Canada, the United States and Mexico to cooperate in 
the planning and implementation of projects to restore waterfowl population to their 
average 1970s level (NAWMP, 2008). Joint ventures were established according to 
identifiable waterfowl habitat areas of major concern when the agreement was signed 
so as to pursue biological-based conservation goals throughout the continent (Sprung, 
1999). The plan recognized that the recovery of the waterfowl population is largely 
dependent upon restoring wetlands and associated ecosystem throughout North 
America (NAWMP, 2008). 
In order to effectively mitigate wetland loss, countries all over the world are 
dedicated to conservation and restoration efforts by broadly participating in a number 
of the above discussed international agreements. 
    The United States is one of the contracting countries to the Ramsar 
Convention and has already designated 22 sites for the List of Wetlands of 
International Importance. The United States National Ramsar Committee (USNRC) is 
the organization formed in the U.S. to promote and advise wise and sustainable use of 
domestic and international wetlands (USNRC, 2008). As one of the parties signing the 
NAWMP, the United States has agreed to restore valuable waterfowl resources and, so 
far, has developed 15 habitat joint ventures over its landscape (DUC, 2008).    
The European Community has also taken decisive steps to fulfill its 
commitments in Ramsar and CBD and to meet the target defined by the heads of state 
and government to halt biodiversity loss by 2010. The first Ramsar sites designated in 
the UK were in 1976 and many more have been designated since then. At this time, 
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there are 166 sites included in the List of Wetlands of International Importance 
(Ramsar, 2009b). In June 1994, the UK ratified the CBD and has since demonstrated 
its strong commitment to the Convention's objectives. It has sought to ensure that in 
pursuing objectives for conserving biodiversity that is regard for wetlands issues, but 
also that there is an appropriate interchange of common sources of data and expertise, 
and minimal duplication of effort (CBD, 2008b). 
Canada has committed itself to extensive international treaties to implement 
wetland conservation activities. Canada participated in Ramsar Convention on May 15, 
1981 and currently has 37 sites designated as Wetlands of International Importance 
under the Convention, with a surface area of 13,066,675 hectares (Ramsar, 2009a). 
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity commits Canada to conserving 
biodiversity and recognizes wetland conservation as integral to that goal (Farnese and 
Belcher, 2006). In April 1998, Canada signed the Kyoto Protocol and formally ratified 
it four years later in December 2002, agreeing to reduce GHG emissions by 6 percent 
below 1990 levels by the commitment period from 2008 to 2012 (Climate Action 
Network Canada, 2004). Wetland conserves important carbon sinks to meet Kyoto 
Protocol requirements. By signing the NAWMP, Canada pledged to conserve 2 million 
hectares of wetland habitat and effectively rehabilitated or restored 685 thousand 
hectares through the 1990s (Southam and Curran, 1996).  
2.3.3 Regional Wetland Policies 
Many governments have invested significant time and effort into the 
mitigation and prevention of the environmental costs associated with agricultural 
development. The value of wetlands for the public have led to establishment of various 
federal, provincial and territorial wetland conservation policies and practices to both 
protect limited wetland resource and balance the private and public interests in 
wetlands. This section provides a general overview of the existing wetlands programs 
within Canada. An overview of policies in the US and EU is also developed to 
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construct the full picture of wetland conservation state over the world. These two 
regions have been chosen because of their important role in driving wetland protection 
activities in the world and their similarity with Canada as developed country. 
2.3.3.1United States 
An important federal government program in the United States for wetlands 
protection is known as the Section 404 permit program. It was created in 1972 when 
Congress passed P.L. 92-500, making extensive amendments to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (now referred to as the Clean Water Act (CWA)) (Carriker, 
1994). It “governs the placement of dredged or fill material into wetlands and other 
waters of the United States” (NRCS, 2008). The primary goal of the CWA was to 
“eliminate the discharge of pollution into lakes and rivers, as well as to improve the 
quality and safety of bodies of water for recreational purposes” (Carriker, 1994). The 
basis for the federal regulatory programs for wetlands can be found in Section 301 of 
the CWA which makes it unlawful to discharge any pollutant into the waters of the 
United States except pursuant to the standard-setting and permitting provisions of the 
Act (Carriker, 1994).  
The Swampbuster provision of the 1985 Food Security Act is an important 
federal wetland protection policy that intends to reduce the rate of wetland conversion 
(Heimlich, 1998). Its provision makes a farm operator ineligible for price support 
payments, farm storage facility loans, crop insurance, disaster payments, and insured 
or guaranteed loans for any year in which an annual crop was planted on converted 
wetlands (Anderson and Magleby, 1997). Results from several studies (Danielson, 
1989, Heimlich et al. 1986, Kramer et al. 1993; as cited in Heimlich, 1998) have 
shown that the effect of Swampbuster to reduce wetland conversion after 1985 has 
been significant. Despite this, there are intensive debates about the severity of the 
Swampbuster penalties and its effectiveness in returning wetland stocks to the 
optimum level by prevention rather than compensation mechanisms (Heimlich, 1998; 
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Anderson and Magleby, 1997).  
Although avoidance and minimization policies are crucial to protect wetlands, 
wetland compensation programs have become important as well in the last decade. 
“No-net-loss” is a federal and state policy goal that was first set out during President 
George H.W. Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign and announced as an administration 
policy at an EPA press conference in January 1989 (Sibbing, 2008). The purpose of 
this policy is to protect wetlands wherever possible and offset wetlands that have been 
converted to other uses through restoration and creation of replacement wetlands to 
make up for unavoidable wetland conversion, thereby maintaining or increasing the 
total wetland resource base (ERS, 1998). The goal of the program not only applies to 
wetland coverage areas within the country but also to the functions and values of those 
wetlands (Sibbing, 2008). This policy was embraced and expanded by President Bill 
Clinton in his administration’s Clean Water Action Plan, the goal of which was to 
attain a net increase of wetland of 100,000 acres per year by 2005. President George W. 
Bush’s administration also embraced the goal of no-net-loss of wetlands and made 
efforts to ensure a net gain in wetland acreage (Sibbing, 2008).  
One of the more specific agricultural programs that has affected wetland 
restoration is the Wetland Reserve Program (WRP). This is a voluntary program that 
was first implemented in the early 1990s with an objective of retiring and restoring 
wetlands that had been converted to cropland by providing cost share assistance and 
long term (30 year) or permanent easements (Lambert et al. 2006). The WRP was 
mandated by Section 1237 of the Food Security Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-198), as 
amended by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101- 
624) and the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-127) 
to assist in protecting and enhancing wetlands while enabling landowners to retain land 
ownership and the rights to recreational uses, such as hunting and fishing (NRCS Farm 
Bill 2002, 2007). WRP participants could benefit by receiving financial and technical 
assistance in return for restoring, protecting and enhancing wetland functions and 
values, seeing a reduction in problems associated with farming potentially difficult 
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areas, and having incentives to develop wildlife and recreational opportunities on their 
land (NRCS Farm Bill 2002, 2007). 
In general, various wetland policies have evolved over the United States’ 
history. Wetland drainage was first encouraged during the period of settlement and 
national expansion which resulted in great loss in wetland resources. However, since 
the 1970’s, wetland preservation was gradually accepted and conservation activities 
were developed. With the adoption of the “no-net-loss” goal, both conservation and 
restoration programs were established to achieve no overall net loss of wetlands and 
the effectiveness has proved to be significant.  
2.3.3.2 European Union and United Kingdom 
Wetlands were one of the very first nature conservation subjects put forward 
for European policy consideration. The Natura 2000 network is the center piece of EU 
biodiversity policy and was established to assure the long-term survival of Europe’s 
most valuable and threatened species and habitats (European Commission, 2007). In 
2000, the wetlands’ communication was overtaken by the Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) which is the most substantial piece of EU water legislation thus far and aims to 
overcome the fragmentation of European water policy. It requires all inland and 
coastal waters to reach good chemical and ecological status by 2015 (European 
Commission, 2007). LIFE, launched in 1992, is the EU’s financial instrument that 
supports environmental and natural conservation projects, which at this time has 
already co-financed over 120 projects that are related to wetlands. Most projects of this 
program give support to the Ramsar Convention and working together with WFD to 
achieve the goal of improving the quality of water and ecosystem (European 
Commission, 2007). 
Each of the EU member countries has developed a different set of policies and 
programs to address wetland issues. As a result, a comprehensive examination of EU 
policies is beyond the scope of this study. However, the United Kingdom represents a 
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reasonable case of EU wetland policy due to its long history and large impact in the 
EU. Like the U.S. wetland conservation policy, the UK also uses a combination of 
voluntary subsidized programs and regulatory programs to achieve environmental 
goals. In England, the Countryside Stewardship Scheme which operates under the 
England Rural Development Program (ERDP) makes payments to farmers and other 
landowners to enhance and conserve wildlife, landscape and the historic features of the 
countryside (WWT, 2008). Landowners involved in the scheme will return the land to 
wetlands by widening ditches and creating new ponds. They also established areas to 
provide wild bird habitats containing pollen and nectar, making the land an ideal 
habitat for other species of birds as well as a range of other wildlife (WWT, 2008). 
Scotland, which contains approximately two-thirds of the remaining wetlands in the 
UK, primarily addresses wetland loss by combined efforts of the Scottish Raised Bog 
Partnership to restore wetlands over 1000 ha across 11 sites in UK’s remaining raised 
bogs, through activities such as removal of non native forest plantations and clearance 
of encroaching scrub (European Commission, 2007). The Wildlife and Countryside 
Act, which was established in 1981 and amended in 1991, is a regulatory Act that 
refers to the treatment and management of protected species. The Act prohibits 
interference with places used for protected species’ shelter or protection or 
intentionally disturbing animals occupying such places like wetlands (WWT, 2008). 
2.3.3.3 Canada  
Although Canada is home to one quarter of the world’s wetlands (National 
Wetlands Working Group, 1988), there is no single government organization to 
develop and implement wetland policies applicable to all jurisdictions. Wetland 
conservation is a shared federal, provincial and territorial responsibility. The federal 
government is a major part of the solution and directly manages about 29 percent of 
the wetlands in Canada, specifically those located on federal lands and waters, 
particularly in the northern territories. These include national parks, community 
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pastures, ports and harbour lands, wildlife areas and a wide range of other crown land 
holdings (Lynch-Stewart et al. 1996; Rubec and Hanson, 2008). The federal 
government is fundamentally acting as a leader and has promised to assist national 
efforts in wetland protection by providing models, knowledge, tools and expertise 
(Government of Canada, 1991). The balance of policy aimed at wetland conservation 
and management are primarily the responsibility of provincial governments and private 
landowners. All levels of governments work as partners and jointly implement many 
wetland management activities (Rubec and Hanson, 2008). 
The most important federal level conservation policy to address wetland 
development is the Federal Policy on Wetland Conservation (FPWC) which was 
published in 1991. This national policy recognized that wetlands are among Canada’s 
most threatened ecosystems. It also commits all federal departments to a no-net-loss of 
wetland functions on all federal lands and waters where wetland loss has reached 
critical levels or when a wetland is designated as important. The FPWC describes a 
number of goals that are consistent with Canada’s obligation under Ramsar and also 
outlines that consultations with the Canadian public indicated a high level of support 
for wetland conservation efforts (Austen and Hanson, 2007). Most goals of wetland 
preservation and degradation minimization were achieved during the immediate years 
following FPWC adoption. However, as FPWC is a federal policy that only directs 
wetlands on federal land, its influence on wetland conservation located in 
privately-owned land is very limited (Cuddington, 2008). In addition, wetland 
restoration and enhancement would be a more important and meaningful step, despite 
the high level of support for wetland conservation (Rubec and Hanson, 2008). A more 
efficient cost-effective mechanism is desirable to determine compensation area 
requirements so as to better replace lost wetlands and riparian functions. However, 
currently there is no formula or matrix to quickly calculate how much compensation 
area is enough for mitigation which is also the major criticism of the FPWC (Austen 
and Hanson, 2007; Rubec and Hanson, 2008). 
The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) which was passed by 
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parliament in 1992 is a “legislative basis for the federal practice of environment 
assessment” and is one of the most important and powerful laws concerning wetlands 
(Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 2008). It provides specific procedures 
for environmental assessment of projects in terms of their potential environmental 
impact before federal authorities can approve them (Lynch-Stewart et al. 1999; 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 2008; Southam and Curran, 1996). 
Specific reference has been applied to wetlands to prevent latent harm. For example, it 
regulates activities likely to affect water as it flows into or out of a wetland and sets up 
a system of water rights acquired through the issuing of licenses (Southam and Curran, 
1996). However, CEAA has little impact on wetlands within private agricultural fields 
in the prairie regions. 
In order to help landowner’s better measure and manage the environmental 
risk that comes with the business of farming, the strategy used in Canadian agriculture 
is the execution of Beneficial Management Practices (BMPs). BMPs are a practice, or 
system of practices, designed to minimize and mitigate the impact and risk of 
agricultural activities on natural resources while at the same time ensuring the 
sustainability of natural resources used for agricultural production and maintain long 
term economic viability of the agricultural industry (AAFC, 2008a). Agricultural 
Policy Framework (APF), a five-year federal-provincial-territorial agreement on 
agriculture that came into force in 2003, enabled agricultural producers and land 
managers who adopt BMPs within their private landscape to receive support from the 
government under the National Farm Stewardship Program (NFSP). This program was 
a joint federal and provincial cost-share initiative under the Environmental chapter of 
APF which provides agricultural producers with technical assistance and financial 
incentives to facilitate the implementation of BMPs (AAFC, 2008b). The federal 
government usually provides financial support through APF while the provincial 
governments provide technical support. The purpose of the NFSP was, on one hand, to 
help landowners reduce environmental risk, reduce the farming impact on water and 
air quality, soil productivity and wild habitat; on the other hand, to reinforce public 
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confidence that Canadian-grown food products are being produced using  
environment friendly systems (Sparling and Brethour, 2007). Environmental Farm 
Plans (EFP) must be completed by producers to be eligible for BMP funding under the 
NFSP (Sparling and Brethour, 2007). In 2006, wetland restoration was officially 
accepted by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) as BMPs within the APF 
under two specific existing BMPs (Category 21: Enhancing Wildlife Habitat and 
Biodiversity and Category 28: Biodiversity Enhancement Planning). This decision 
means that landowners who adopt BMPs and who are eligible under the NFSP will be 
able to take advantage of government technical assistance and funding to ensure the 
wetland is restored as close as possible to the original size, depth and ecological 
function (DUC, 2006). There are a number of BMPs that could be adopted by 
Canadian landowners. Statistics from the National Funding Program show that the 
adoption of certain BMPs vary in different agricultural regions in Canada. For the PPR, 
an improved cropping system involving developed tillage types and improved 
applications of fertilizer are more popular than other practices to be adopted by 
landowners (Sparling and Brethour, 2007).  
2.3.3.4 Saskatchewan 
In Saskatchewan, many policy measures have been developed to promote the 
conservation of provincial wetlands but most of these have not proven to be 
particularly effective in conserving wetlands. From the mid-1990’s, the province of 
Saskatchewan established a series of both wetland policy and legislation to protect 
wetlands. The Saskatchewan Wetland Policy was adopted in 1995 which is the 
province of Saskatchewan’s commitment to preserve wetlands. The key document 
Wetland Policy Statement promotes the sustainable management of wetlands to 
maintain the “numbers, diversity and productive capacity of wetlands”. This policy 
was implemented by provincial government departments and agencies and led by the 
Saskatchewan Wetland Conservation Corporation. The policy focused on the 
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sustainable management of wetlands on public and private lands to maintain their 
functions and benefits, the conservation of wetlands essential to maintain critical 
wetland species or functions and the restoration or rehabilitation of degraded wetland 
ecosystems (Lynch-Stewart et al, 1999). The supplement Guide to Saskatchewan 
Wetland Policy which was issued in the same year included “next steps” concerning 
public awareness, wetland monitoring, land use planning guidelines and landowner 
encouragement to maintain wetlands. This policy is now being revised by the 
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority (SWA) (Rubec and Hanson, 2008). 
Following the adoption of wetland policy, Saskatchewan’s Water 
Management Framework was released by the Minister of Saskatchewan Environment 
and Resource Management (SERM) in 1999. This document lists nine goals and 
sixteen objectives of water management in Saskatchewan that would be initiated over 
the next five years. It also outlines 58 actions that are related to protection of water 
resources, co-ordination of government activities and public involvement in decision 
making (Government of Saskatchewan, 1999). Some objectives and actions relate 
specifically to wetlands and associated riparian areas and commit the government to 
wetland conservation. However, since certain action items have been assigned to 
different governmental agencies to implement, actions are developed at very different 
rates. Some are underway while some are not initiated yet. Conflict between the two 
leading agencies, Sask Water and SERM, concerning placement of accountability for 
attaining Framework’s objectives have also contributed complexity to objective 
realization (CSALE, 2002). 
In 2002, Saskatchewan’s Environmental Management and Protection Act 
(EMPA) was introduced with primary responsibility for all matters with respect to the 
environment. Although the Act considered water resource protection, it has been 
deemed incomplete since it does not recognize water resources located within 
private-owned landscape. In the Act, crown water bodies were identified as requiring a 
process of protection. However, crown water in Saskatchewan only refers to water 
bodies and watercourses owned by provincial or federal governments, privately owned 
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lands are not included (Rubec and Hanson, 2008). By this definition, the EMPA does 
not require that landowners protect private areas that do not flow into a provincial or 
federal watercourse such as isolated basins, sloughs and marshes. In other words, this 
act provides farm producers freedom to do any activities they deem appropriate with 
wetlands on their own land except if this causes water to affect crown waters. The 
potential of this policy will limit the mitigation opportunities to some extent and will 
prevent effective protection of wetlands and riparian zones (Thompson, 2005, as cited 
in Rubec and Hanson, 2008).  
The Saskatchewan Watershed Authority (SWA) was established in 2002 to 
provide technical assistance and regulatory guidance to the agri-food industry 
regarding water quality protection. In 2005, the Watershed Authority adopted the 
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act to manage and protect water quantity and 
quality within the province. The management is developed through a planning model 
based on stakeholder involvement for broad application. Local watershed advisory 
committees have been established in priority watersheds across the province to guide 
the planning process and to identify water protection issues. The Act licenses on-farm 
wetland drainage and is responsible for issuing drainage licenses on agricultural 
Crown lands used by landowners under lease arrangements (Rubec and Hanson, 2008). 
The Authority is currently developing a draft wetland and drainage policy to provide 
clear expectations and direction to prevent negative downstream impacts of drainage 
while reducing the regulatory burden (SWA, 2007). However, despite the importance 
the SWA Act plays in provincial wetlands protection, it is incomplete in defining 
wetlands and ignores the most threatened seasonal wetlands within agricultural 
landscape (Cuddington, 2008). 
In addition to the above regulations, other statutes applied to wetland 
management in Saskatchewan include the Environment Assessment Act which uses 
enforcement measures to protect specific wetlands through the granting of permits, 
licenses or approvals. The Wildlife Habitat Protection Act which preserve specific 
wetland habitat areas, and the Conservation Easement Act which use voluntary 
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easement agreements to facilitate environmental goods conservation while leaving the 
land and management to the landowner (Lynch-Stewart et al, 1999). There are a 
variety of wetland conservation policies existing at the provincial level, but not all of 
them are efficient in achieving the goals of protection as discussed. A clear 
understanding of the strength and weakness of these current policies is necessary and 
will act as guidance for better policy provision. 
2.3.4 Summary of the Policy Landscape 
       Across the world, it is clear that governments and their many sectors have 
implemented wetland policy change over their history. Direct and indirect incentives to 
convert wetlands for economic development, which used to be popular, were gradually 
eliminated in recent decades with the increasing scientific understanding of the 
important functions wetlands and riparian areas provide. Support for wetland 
conservation policies has grown in both federal and provincial scale through a variety 
of mechanisms including regulations, economic incentives and education. Besides 
those policies that directly address wetland loss, a number of complementary 
legislations affecting wetland conservation were also commonly adopted by 
governments such as wildlife management, water issues, land use planning, fisheries 
management and environmental protection. For Canada, due to the separation of 
responsibilities and limitation of federal power over provincial wetland management, 
federal-provincial cooperation and coordination on wetland policy is desirable to 
achieve efficient and effective policy implementation. All levels of government’s full 
participation in those agreements play a critical role in their success. 
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2.4 Economic Valuation for Wetlands and Riparian Zones 
2.4.1 Introduction 
To effectively address the problem of riparian wetland loss and understand the 
efficiency of wetland conservation policy, the first step is to adequately evaluate the 
economic value of wetlands, which has been interpreted as representing the value of 
wetlands to society. Open market price can be adopted as one measure to carry on the 
valuation, but it only reflects the minimum price people would like to pay rather than 
extra subjective and intrinsic values (Environment Canada, 2001). To capture the full 
values involved in wetlands, benefits should be measured by the entire worth of the 
benefits to the potential buyers—that is, the full price people are willing to pay to 
enjoy wetland benefits, no matter if the payment is actually paid (Barbier et al. 1997).   
The importance of evaluating the economic value of wetland goods and 
services has been summarized as follows (Barbier et al. 1997; Lambert, 2003), 
a) Wetland resources and systems are often undervalued or ignored under 
traditional cost-benefit analysis. Although wetlands support an array of valuable 
resource output and ecological services, not all of them could be marketed. Many 
wetland amenity services are provided free to all individuals and no one could be 
excluded from enjoying, which make them very difficult to be priced through regular 
trading process even if they are desired. This is often explained in economic terms as 
the public good nature of environmental goods which make wetland services liable to 
be undervalued. A detailed discussion of public goods will be presented in chapter 3. 
As a result, when decisions are made to convert wetlands to other use, only the direct 
costs of conversion are calculated as the decision costs rather than the loss of those 
potentially significant environmental functions wetlands provide. 
b) Economic valuation is an important tool for wetland management. 
Environmental functions and benefits supported by wetlands are multi-faceted and 
complex. Sometimes it is not easy for government decision makers to determine the 
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costs and benefits of measures implemented and to ensure a wise use of wetland 
resources. Economic valuation helps decision makers analyze the gain and loss under 
each decision option and investigate how these decisions would affect social welfare 
with changed wetland resource allocation. Effectively determining the value of a 
wetland system is fundamental in achieving the desired policy goal because the failure 
to evaluate the full benefits and costs of conversion or conservation is a major factor 
behind the design of inappropriate development policies.    
To illustrate the role of economic valuation in wetland use and how valuation 
studies could be conducted in wetland management decisions, the following sections 
provide a general summary of the economic valuation mechanisms and techniques that 
are used in wetland management research and development. Market mechanisms are 
powerful in measuring value but only capture partial direct values (drinking water, 
irrigation, carbon values, etc.) and are applied to limited products and services, while 
non-market mechanisms are more flexible and are appropriate to determine indirect 
and non-market values (erosion control, biodiversity, recreational use, etc.). Choosing 
the appropriate approach to assign monetary value to goods and services provided by 
wetland and riparian zones is important to induce policy to maintain the optimum 
wetland allocation. 
2.4.2 Market Mechanisms 
Market valuation approaches use standard economic methods to measure the 
economic benefits and costs for marketed environmental goods based on the quantity 
demanded and supplied at different prices (King and Mazzotta, 2000). This valuation 
method uses observed data of actual consumer preference and accepted economic 
techniques and therefore, is reliable in measuring people’s value of goods bought and 
sold in the market. The following discussion highlights some specific applications and 
examples of market approaches used to value wetlands and the goods and services they 
provide. 
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2.4.2.1 Wetland Mitigation Banking  
Wetland mitigation banking is a market mechanism that reveals values of 
wetlands through market exchanges. It typically involves the consolidation of many 
small wetland mitigation projects into a larger, potentially more ecologically valuable 
site and improves efficiencies in application and permitting processes (WSDE, 2008). 
This management method works as a companion program to the “no net loss policy” 
and helps reduce wetland loss due to failure of traditional mitigation and the time lag 
between wetland impact and compensation (Ramsar Forum, 1998; Washington 
Department of Ecology, 2006). Usually the mitigation for 1 hectare of lost wetland is 
required at ratios of 2 or 3 to 1 to ensure there is no net loss of wetland functions. 
While in Canada, this mitigation approach is not commonly practiced by any province 
(Rubec and Hanson, 2008), in 2005, it was estimated that there were at least 405 
mitigation banks issued by the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) in the United States. 
This number represented an 85 percent increase from the total number in 2001 and a 
780 percent increase from 1992 (ELI, 2008). Mitigation banks are collections of 
wetlands that have been created, restored, enhanced or preserved for the purpose of 
earning compensatory credits permitted under the federal government programs in the 
United States, the Section 404 or similar local wetland regulations. These 
compensatory mitigation credits could be owned by landowners or be sold on the 
market to those needing to compensate for unavoidable negative impacts to another 
wetland (Hansen, 2007). Credits are usually measured in terms of wetland acreage to 
represent the level of service it provides (Hansen, 2007).  
According to information from Mclemore Mitigation Bank (the first bank in 
the States to develop both a wetland and stream mitigation component), the credit is 
calculated based on both the purchase value of the raw land and the wetlands proposed 
for impact (quality of wetland), which is evaluated by the Wetland Rapid Assessment 
Procedures (WARP) index rating from 0.0-1.0 (Mclemore Mitigation Bank, 2008). The 
current rate schedule for wetland credit in Alabama with transactions under 25 credits 
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is $15,000/credit with the raw land value less than $45,000/acre ($111,150/ha). If the 
raw land value is greater than $45,000/acre, the credit price will be 1/3 of the land 
value/acre (Mclemore Mitigation Bank, 2008). Although the credit price is highly 
variable across time and space, research has shown prices have been as high as 
$45,000/acre ($111,150/ha) in Florida (Bond and Pompe, 2004).  
2.4.2.2 Fee Hunting 
Another partially marketed service provided by wetlands and riparian zones 
for private landowners is the ecological support for species that are the target of 
fee-based hunting and fishing. Fee hunting allows land managers to sell access to their 
land to hunters for consumptive activities like hunting and fishing and also 
non-consumptive activities such as bird watching and nature tours. The promotion of 
commercial recreation on private wetlands creates financial incentives to landowners 
and encourages voluntary conservation and restoration of ecological sensitive wetland 
areas with limited governmental regulation involvement (Jones et al. 2001). 
Landowners could diversity their income through commercial hunting activities which 
provides a financial incentive to ensure the presence of high quality habitats on their 
land. Kazmierczak (2001) provides a review of estimation of the commercial hunting 
and fishing service values generated by an acre of wetland. Four different categories of 
studies were identified to present the values. From the report by Jones et al. (2001), 
hunting leases were revealed to be the most common payment method used for fee 
hunting. Annual net revenues for landowners derived from fee hunting averaged 
$3.91/acre ($9.66/ha) statewide and $2.17/acre ($5.36/ha) in the Gulf Coast counties. 
Kazmierczak’s (2001) study reported the annual price of hunting and fishing services 
ranged from $1.05/acre ($2.59/ha) (blue crab in Florida) to $663.74/acre ($1640.14/ha) 
(oyster at Northumberland, Virginia). The mean and median value were $152.28/acre 
($376.29/ha) to 8.73/acre ($21.57/ha) each year respectively. In other countries hunting 
services were valued from $16.76/acre ($41.41/ha) to $120.84/acre ($298.6/ha) with 
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the mean and median annual values of $54.21 ($133.96/ha) and $25.03/acre ($61.85/ha) 
respectively (Kazmierczak, 2001). 
2.4.2.3 Carbon Market 
Global warming is a significant environmental problem and a challenge for 
human beings. Governments and international groups are looking for ways to decrease 
the impact of greenhouse gas (GHG) on people and are focusing on the development 
of the emissions trading markets such as carbon markets. Wetlands, which act as 
natural carbon reservoirs, present an essential opportunity for GHG offset and carbon 
trading. Storage of carbon in wetlands and marketing carbon credits, as a viable market 
mechanism tool, helps promote sustainable environmental development and provide 
additional income for private landowners. Antle and Mooney (2001) in evaluating 
issues that arise in designing policies to increase carbon sequestration in agricultural 
soils showed that policies based on payments per-tonne of carbon sequestered are more 
efficient than those based on per-hectare payments for changes in production practices. 
According to Brethour and Klimas (2008), based on the Alberta Climate Change and 
Emissions Management Act, facilities that produce more than 100,000 tonnes of 
greenhouse gases annually should reduce their emissions by 12 percent by January 1st, 
2008. This reduction could be achieved either by paying into the Climate Change and 
Emissions Management Technology Fund at $15/tonne of emissions over the target or 
by purchasing recognized emissions reduction credits that are currently selling from $6 
to $8/tonne. Statistics from the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCE) (the world’s first 
active voluntary, legally binding integrated trading system) indicate that the price 
accepted by the trading parties during 5 months (Jan. 2008-May 2008) ranged from 
$2-$7/tonne of CO2e. The transaction cost associated with signing carbon contracts is 
estimated to be 15 percent commission plus an exchange rate (Brethour and Klimas, 
2008). Shabman and Scodari (2004) proposed a new institutional structure (Credit 
Resale Program) to apply market principles to expand the quantity of and lower the 
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prices of credits while assuring that wetlands credit sales helps realize the no net loss 
goal. According to Cuddington (2008), assuming a price of $5/tonne CO2e, utilizing 
private carbon markets in conjunction with publicly funded program would help 
reduce 20 percent of the program payments. 
2.4.3 Non­market Valuation Method 
Although market measures presented above provide accepted mechanisms to 
assign value to goods and services provided by wetlands and riparian zones, the total 
benefits are not fully captured. A range of social services and benefits cannot be 
normally traded on markets especially for the non-marketable direct use value and 
indirect value of wetland because such markets sometimes do not exist or are 
insufficiently well developed to provide good price information. Therefore, other 
valuation approaches have been developed to put value on these wetland goods and 
services. Due to the fact that the development of effective conservation policy requires 
an understanding of the full costs and benefits of conserving wetland function within 
an agricultural landscape, non-market valuation methods are appropriate to value the 
costs and benefits environment provides as they can reflect people’s full willingness to 
pay. Contingent valuation methods and Hedonic pricing methods are relevant 
ecosystem service economic valuation techniques when market valuations do not 
adequately capture social value. As such, they are explicitly introduced in this section. 
Other ecosystem valuation methods include travel cost method, contingent choice 
method and productivity method etc. Examples of valuation results from previous 
work are also illustrated.   
2.4.3.1 Hedonic Pricing 
Hedonic pricing is a non-market valuation method that has come to play a 
growing role in measuring ecosystem service value in recent years. As explained by 
Swinton et al. (2007), the hedonic method for non-market valuation relies on market 
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transactions for differentiated goods to determine the value of key underlying 
characteristics. As such, the hedonic method is an indirect valuation method in which 
we do not observe the value consumers have for the characteristic directly, but infer it 
from an observable market. This method most commonly uses variations in residential 
properties prices that reflect the value of local environmental quality and amenities. 
Since housing markets are quite efficient in responding to the information, the results 
from this method can represent good indicators (King and Mazzotta, 2000). However, 
due to complexity of the method, a large amount of data must be gathered and 
manipulated and a high degree of statistical expertise is required to obtain the desired 
model specification (King and Mazzotta, 2000). In a hedonic pricing analysis of 
residential properties in Maryland, Irwin (2002) concluded that compared to residential, 
commercial or industrial uses, open space located within 400m of a residential 
property increased residential prices by 2.6 percent ($4523) if the land is preserved as 
private conservation land and will increase by 1.2 percent ($2038) if the land is a 
public land. Tapsuwan, Ingram and Brennan (2007) found that the existence of urban 
wetlands helps improve sales prices of surrounding properties by analyzing data from 
Western Australia. The results showed that the sale price of a property increased by 
$5726 with the existence of an additional wetland within 1.5 kilometers of the property. 
The total premium in property sale price due to wetland (50 ha) proximity was $207 
million, based on average property characteristics and medium house density. 
Tyrvainen’s and Miettinen’s (2000) research showed that residential house prices 
decreased by 5.9 percent with an increase in the distance to the nearest forest area of 1 
km. However, values estimated by Norris, Ahern, and Koontz (1994) are not consistent 
with the above studies. They applied a conventional present model to estimate the 
costs of wetland regulation to producers and impact of wetland regulations exposure to 
landowners on land prices, using hedonic approach. These result showed that increased 
exposure to wetland regulation had little effect on land prices.  
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2.4.3.2 Contingent Valuation Method 
Contingent valuation method (CVM) is a survey-based valuation 
methodology for eliciting values people place on goods, services and amenities 
(Swinton et al. 2007) and is the most widely used method for estimating values when 
markets do not exist and revealed preference methods are not applicable. The CVM 
attempts to assign dollar values for the public goods by directly asking people the 
maximum amount the individual would be willing to pay (WTP) to obtain the 
non-market amenity or the minimum level of financial incentives they would be 
willing to accept (WTA) to compensate for a loss of an environmental amenity (King 
and Mazzotta, 2000). Contingent markets has been highly structured to circumvent the 
absence of markets for environmental goods by presenting consumers with 
well-defined hypothetical markets in which they have the opportunity to pay for the 
good in question. 
However, although contingent valuation methods are commonly used, it is 
also the most controversial of the non-market valuation methods. The CVM has been 
criticized because it requires people to respond to a specific hypothetical scenario and 
description of the environmental service. The pre-assumption is that the respondents 
understand the good in question and will reveal their preferences in the contingent 
market just as they would in a real market. However, bias often occur due to the 
problem that respondents are unfamiliar with placing dollar value on a non-market 
product because they are confronted by a hypothetical market in which they have no 
means or purpose in being involved rather than an actual set of choices that are 
relevant to market decisions made each day. Therefore they have an insufficient 
knowledge basis or little past experience for stating their true value (King and 
Mazzotta, 2000). The fact that the contingent valuation method is based on what 
people say they would do, as opposed to what people are observed to do, is the source 
of its greatest strengths and its greatest weaknesses. 
 
At present, there is a lack of information to quantify landowners’ non-market 
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valuation, from the supply side of the wetland market, of the goods and services 
provided by wetlands within private landscape. However, this information is important 
since it provides essential inputs for decision making regarding wetland management 
in the PPR where the majority of land is private farm land. The present study will help 
reflect the cost of supplying wetlands and conserve them in a sustainable way.  
Until now only few studies have contributed to this information. Lynch et al. 
(2002) developed a random utility model to examine the level of financial incentives 
Maryland landowners require to voluntarily establish riparian buffers on agricultural 
land for 15 years. Their conclusion was that higher incentive payments, part-time 
farming and education level had a positive influence on the respondent’s WTA bid 
while age and the decision to continue farming for more than 15 years had a negative 
influence. The mean annual incentive payment indicated by respondents was $112/acre 
($277/ha). 
Some research does provide information on landowners’ valuation of 
environmental benefits but are not directly relevant to wetland conservation. Shaikh et 
al. study (2007) investigated the factors affecting landowners’ participation in 
agricultural tree plantations. The result shows that age, soil type and income are 
significant factors to get landowners to plant trees. The average WTA required by 
landowners to plant trees is estimated about $33/acre ($81.5/ha). Kline et al. (2000) 
found that the mean incentive payment to induce forest owners to forego timber 
harvest in riparian areas ranged from $38/acre ($94/ha) to $137/acre ($338/ha) 
depending on owner’s objectives. 
There has been substantial wetland non-market valuation focused on society’s 
valuation of wetland from the demand side (e.g. wetland consumers) by asking about 
their maximum WTP to enjoy all ecosystem goods and services supported by wetlands. 
Do and Bennett (2007) quantified wetland non-market benefits in the Mekong River 
Delta (MRD) by estimating WTP for improvements in the wetland biodiversity, using 
environmental choice modeling. Personal interviews were conducted in three locations. 
The results showed that the overall WTP for the proposed wetland conservation range 
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was $0 to $2.5 per household. Older, more educated and wealthier respondents had a 
higher WTP. Birol et al. (2006) discovered that the mean WTP for improving wetland 
management attributes in Cheimaditida, Greece, was €107.56 ($81.49) to €134.46 
($101.86) depending on different management scenarios. Bennett et al. (1997) 
estimated WTP to avoid any destructive activities to Tilley swamp and The Coorong in 
South Australia. A one-time payment indicated by respondents was about $45 per 
household (Bennett et al. 1997; as cited in Whitten, 2003).   
The research reported in this thesis is intended to fill the information gap by 
estimating non-market values of wetlands located in private landscape using 
information from landowners in PPR. Specifically, it estimates WTA for restoring and 
maintaining wetland and riparian zones in agricultural regions. More details of the case 
study information are provided in Chapter 4. 
2.5 Summary 
Wetlands and associated riparian areas have historically been considered 
wasteland and undergone exploitation and degradation activities. Agricultural 
production, acting as one of the leading threats, contributed to a major loss of wetlands. 
Although wetlands are neither upland in our traditional sense nor bodies of open water, 
they constitute some of most productive natural habitat and contribute extensively to a 
healthy ecosystem.  
Society’s awareness of the value of wetlands has grown rapidly in the last few 
decades and resulted in significant changes in governmental policies. Federal, 
provincial and territory policies have been developed to improve the health of wetlands 
through protection and restoration efforts.  
Society values wetlands, but since most wetland benefits are freely enjoyed by 
all of society private owners are usually unable to benefit economically from 
conserving wetlands on their lands. In another words, the difference between public 
and private interests in protecting and converting wetlands is the key problem. This is 
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where market inefficiency exists and needs to be addressed using suitable wetland 
policies. Currently, there are several existing market management tools to assist 
landowners to assess partial economic benefits by trading wetland services. There are 
also non-market methods available to determine the value of goods and services 
wetlands and riparian areas offer. In order to better quantify the returns that private 
landowners require from wetland preservation and better achieve the goal of policies, 
it is important to examine the case at hand and choose the method most appropriate. 
The next chapter proposes a theoretical framework to explain the market failure and 
the wetland allocation problems. 
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CHAPTER 3  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
Wetland issues have played a crucial part in agricultural and environmental 
debate for quite a long period of time. Because of the valuable service and benefits 
wetlands offer in many cases it could be argued that social welfare will be greater by 
maintaining or improving the quality and quantity of the remaining wetlands. However, 
as wetland resources are often undervalued under the current market system, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, they are likely to be ignored during development decisions and 
be converted to alternative uses. The under-supply of wetlands on the agricultural 
landscapes is often explained in economic terms as a market failure. At this stage, there 
is a role for some form of governmental intervention. This chapter presents a 
theoretical framework to help evaluate the costs and benefits associated with wetlands 
and riparian zones located on privately owned agricultural land. The theoretical 
framework will be applied to analyze the specific problem in the following chapter. 
The chapter will begin by discussing factors causing the market failure and the 
influence of market failure in allocating agriculture land. Then a graphical model will 
be developed to further illustrate the problem in the wetland demand and supply and 
show how policy could be used to address the inefficiency.  
3.2 Market Failure in Agricultural Landscapes 
3.2.1 The Role of Economic Valuation 
The possibility to efficiently estimate the value of environment resources and 
wetlands specifically in dollar terms has received much attention in recent years. As 
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discussed in section 2.4.1, estimating the correct value of wetland goods and service is 
essential to inform wetland management and policy decisions. This process can be 
described as the first step of the strategy. Theoretically, this is a process to assign dollar 
values to goods and services provided by wetlands and riparian zones. In classical 
economics, the dollar value of a good is determined through the open market decided 
by the interaction of consumers demand and producers supply for the good. But this is 
not always possible for ecosystem goods and services since many such goods and 
services are complex and multifunctional (Barbier et al. 1997). Sometimes there is 
simply no direct market for these goods and services and sometimes the ecological 
values provided are intrinsically non-marketable (Lambert, 2003). However, such 
non-market benefits do represent real economic value, the quantity of money a 
consumer would be willing to pay, which need to be included in the decision making 
process (Environment Canada, 2001). The danger, if the unpriced value is not included 
in development decisions, is policy makers can not quantify the consequence of 
decisions and hence the final outcome of the policy will be biased in favor of those 
uses which have commercial value and many environmental resources cannot be 
properly conserved. If a wetland is converted without proper valuation, the result can 
be a significant economic loss to society, which is the opportunity cost of conversion. 
Such costs may include essential environmental functions as well as the biological 
values the wetland provides. Unfortunately, such opportunity costs are often neglected 
or undervalued by the public. For example, if only the direct conversion costs are 
valued as the cost of exploitation of an environmental resource, the decision is very 
likely to be conversion. However, if the costs of foregone potential environmental and 
biological functions are also included, the decision might change to wetland 
conservation since the perceived costs of conversion will be higher. Therefore 
economic valuation for environmental resources such as wetlands play an important 
role when prevailing market valuation mechanisms don’t effectively represent their 
environmental benefits. With the help of economic valuation, the competing uses of 
environmental resource can be effectively compared based on the tradeoffs of resource 
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allocation options to provide decision makers information that can directly inform 
conservation policies and increase the efficiency of resources management. 
3.2.2 Why Markets Fail 
Many of the goods and services provided by wetlands are not effectively 
represented by market prices that represent their value to society, and as a result, are 
undervalued. These costs and/or benefits are referred to as externalities (external costs 
and external benefits). In the presence of externalities, there is a market failure. In fact, 
market failure is relatively common in practice especially in the environmental goods 
and services market because of their nature. It commonly occurs when market price 
signals do not reflect the full or the true costs of goods and services. The failure, from 
a social perspective, will further result in suboptimal distribution of land use and 
enables allocation of goods and services in a way that does not maximize net social 
welfare, in other words, the allocation of resources will be inefficient. Four main 
inter-related explanations have been provided. 
 
(a) Public good nature 
Wetlands produce a number of benefits that could be shared by all the people. The 
whole community can gain welfare from the services wetland and riparian zones 
offer. However, many of these goods and services have public good characteristics 
which make it difficult or impossible for these goods and services to be exchanged 
in a market. In economics, public goods exist where the consumption of an 
environmental service is non-rival1 and non-exclusive2. Some wetland services are 
non-exclusive but rival such as wetland direct market use values (Table 2.1). These 
services are usually open to all public but diminish as use increases (Barbier et al. 
1997). There are also many benefits that are non-exclusive and non-rival such as 
                                                        
1 Non-rival property: The consumption of good or service by one person will not prevent others from enjoying it 
(Cowen, 2008). 
2 Non-exclusive property: People without paying for the service could also benefit from it without being excluded 
(Cowen, 2008). 
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wetland amenity values, biodiversity and ecological support. For these services, all 
people can enjoy the benefits simultaneously without exclusion no matter if they 
pay for access or not. In such situations, it would be extremely difficult to limit the 
use to a few individuals, prevent others’ consumption and market the service. 
Therefore they are liable to be undervalued.  
(b) Poorly-defined property rights 
Another factor that can cause a market failure is the fact that many wetland goods 
and services do not have clearly defined property rights. Property rights represent 
“one individual’s ability, in expected terms, to consume the goods or the services 
directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange” (Barzel, 1997; cited by 
Whitten, 2003). Well-defined property rights are crucial since they set a permit for 
individuals to benefit from possession and control and also encourage rational 
preservation and management. Private ownership excludes others from destruction 
and solves the problem of open access to a resource (Byrne, 2004). In the case of 
wetlands, the property rights are assigned but there is ambiguity and uncertainty in 
regulating some rights of wetlands especially for those located in privately owned 
lands (Cuddington, 2008). Debate has focused on whether government has the 
authority to regulate land use on privately owned land for public environmental 
purpose. For landowners, they purchase the land with the expectation that the land 
could be converted to any type of land they wish. But from a social welfare 
perspective even though private property rights are respected and protected under 
certain laws, society may need to reserve certain rights to take property for public 
use and the management decisions should be made in a socially acceptable way 
(Cuddington, 2008). Absence of clearly defined property rights for the range of 
goods and services provided by wetlands make it difficult or impossible for market 
price to correctly determine how wetlands should be used and who benefits and 
loses from the use of wetlands (Heimlich et al, 1998). 
(c) Limited information 
   Poor information and limited understanding of the ecological functions provided 
 50 
by wetlands and riparian zones is another potential cause of market failure. The 
effective transmission of information about the costs and benefits associated with 
wetlands and riparian areas, as well as the individual’s actions based on this 
information, are the basic foundation of wetland markets. Accurate information can 
assist landowners in making rational decisions of land use and choose the most 
effective land allocation strategy (Whitten, 2003). However, even though a number 
of extension and technical assistance policies have been developed to disseminate 
such information, there is an incomplete understanding of the important role 
wetlands and riparian zones play in the whole ecosystem, as well as the 
understanding of how different management will influence the quality and quantity 
of ecosystem goods and services. To date, society has only realized the benefits of 
wetlands and riparian zones services after they have disappeared since only then 
those actual monetary costs are incurred. This lack of scientific understanding 
undervalues wetland benefits and contributes to market failure (Environment 
Canada, 2001).  
 (d) Externalities 
In economics, an externality describes a situation in which the “private costs or 
benefits to the producers or purchasers of a good or service differs from the total 
social costs or benefits entailed in its production and consumption” (Johnson, 
2003). In other words, an externality occurs when a party in the market does not 
carry all the costs or does not obtain all the benefits of the economic activity. An 
externality could either be positive (external benefit) or negative (external cost) 
(Johnson, 2003). For example, if a landowner implements wetland conservation 
management on private land and mitigates flooding in the area, he provides 
external benefits since the activity not only benefits himself but also his neighbors. 
On the other hand, another landowner who drains and clears wetland on the 
landscape imposes external costs by increasing the probability of flooding the 
whole neighborhood. The relationship between externalities and social values can 
be represented as:  
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Social cost (benefit) = Private cost (benefit) + Externality effects 
Either positive or negative externalities would create a problem for the price 
mechanism and makes it difficult for effective working wetland market to 
maximize net benefits to society. The existence of the externalities means that one 
or more aspects of property rights must be incomplete because they are not clearly 
defined (Whitten, 2003). Compared to the general community, the benefits the 
individual owner receives from wetlands and riparian areas constitute only a small 
proportion of total benefits they provide (Environment Canada, 2001). A wetland 
may provide habitat for migratory birds and reduce flooding on downstream 
properties, but fail to generate significant benefits for its owner (Heimlich et al. 
1998). For example, the biodiversity supported by wetlands create significant 
public benefits such as maintaining distinct biological species, providing scientific 
and medical research services and assuring environmental sustainability. However, 
the direct benefit one individual recognizes is relatively limited. When landowners 
cannot recognize the value of conserving wetlands but could benefit substantially 
from converting, they will no longer pay to conserve, which will results in market 
failure and wetland under-supply.  
 
Because of the public good nature of wetlands and associated riparian areas, 
and related difficulty in assigning property rights, many of the values wetlands create 
are common assets that are free to society. No individual has to pay to enjoy those 
public goods and services. With limited knowledge of wetlands and widely shared 
resources that are already provided at no cost, there is little incentive for an individual 
to benefit others thus creates the externalities. As a result the market does not provide 
an efficient level of goods and services provided by wetlands and associated riparian 
areas. The consequences of a market failure in wetland and riparian area allocation 
within agricultural landscapes are discussed in the next section. 
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3.2.3 Wetland Supply in Agricultural System 
A market failure results in limited wetland protection and acts as a major 
reason wetland resources are undersupplied from a social welfare perspective. Within 
North American agricultural landscapes “the vast majority of the land and therefore the 
wetlands within these land holdings are usually privately owned” (Farnese and Belcher, 
2006). There is usually a private financial incentive for agricultural landowners to 
maintain the quality for their land by limiting soil erosion, avoiding excessive use of 
chemical inputs and taking other necessary measures to protect soil productivity. 
However, due to ineffective valuation of wetlands, there is usually little private 
incentive for landowners to invest in conservation efforts or to prevent or mitigate 
environmental damages that impose offsite costs (Lambert et al. 2006). Private 
landowners will tend to make decisions to convert wetlands to agricultural production 
when they find that the economic returns they receive from other uses is larger than 
what they would obtain if the wetlands were kept in their natural state (Heimlich et al, 
1998). Therefore, as it is difficult for an individual landowner to receive direct 
monetary profits from the benefits that a wetland provides to others, the true value of 
these benefits are often not taken into account in land allocation decisions. In general, 
the absence of incentives for conservation will lead economically rational people to 
engage in environmentally damaging behavior and convert wetlands and riparian area 
to what was perceived to be more beneficial land uses because it confers a net personal 
profit, even though it imposes a net cost on society (Environment Canada, 2001). A 
consequence of this incomplete information is the extensive conversion of wetlands 
that has occurred over the last 50 plus years. Butler and Macey explain, “Since 
individuals in a market system respond only to the benefits and costs that they actually 
receive and pay for, the market system may be inadequate to deal with externalities” 
(Lee, 2006). 
In order to counteract the problem of market failure and to reduce the 
difference between costs and returns for an individual’s conservation efforts, there is a 
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need for government to intervene to increase or maintain social welfare. Specifically, 
the major objective of government intervention is to encourage the increased supply of 
environmental goods and services through changing the land allocation to benefit 
society. The following section introduces a graphical model to further explain why 
wetland conversion actions happen and how public policies could be applied to address 
the problem.   
3.3 A Graphical Model of Land Allocation  
A graphical model3 is introduced in this section to present a basic framework 
summarizing allocation of wetlands and riparian areas. In figure 3.1, the horizontal 
axis represents the original stock of wetlands and riparian zones, in terms of land area, 
on the agricultural landscape. In this model, it is assumed that wetlands and riparian 
zones could be allocated either as original wetlands and riparian zones or to other uses 
such as agricultural production according to landowners’ management decisions based 
on the incentives that are apparent to them. At this point, it is assumed that there is no 
government policy or regulation driving wetland and riparian conservation. The 
quantity of land converted from wetland to other uses is represented by the horizontal 
axis moving from the right (C) while the quantity of land still allocated to wetlands is 
represented by the horizontal axis moving from the left (P). The vertical axis 
represents an index of value of the marginal benefits provided by the land allocation in 
dollar value per hectare. For the purpose of the model, it is assumed that values from 
all land allocations can be quantified in dollars.  
                                                        
3 This discussion is developed and modified based on the work from Heimlich et al, 1998. 
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Figure 3.1 Wetland conversion and preservation   
Source: Adapted from Heimlich et al. (1998) 
 
The marginal benefits from wetland and riparian zone conversion are denoted 
as MBcp4. This curve represents the net marginal benefits private landowners obtain by 
converting an incremental hectare of wetland. For the purpose of this discussion, MBcp 
also represents the social marginal benefit from converting wetlands assuming that 
there are no external benefits provided by converting wetlands. This is based on the 
fact that although wetland conversion generates both private and social benefits, public 
benefits constitute only a small portion of the total benefits from wetland conversion. 
In reality, public benefits of conversion do exist such as increased crop production in 
the market and lower consumer prices. However, when wetlands are converted to 
produce agricultural commodities that are traded in a market, most of the benefits 
generated will be reflected by the price of the commodities and captured by private 
landowners. Compared to these private benefits, the social benefits provided by 
conversion are small and as a result are assumed to be zero in this model (Lee, 2006).  
                                                        
4 The marginal net benefits are adjusted for direct conversion costs such as drainage costs but not for indirect 
opportunity cost such as wetland benefits foregone. Opportunity costs of wetland conversion are embodied in the 
marginal benefit to preservation.  
Wetland preserved (P) Wetland converted (C) 
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MBcp would typically be expected to decrease as the area of wetlands and 
riparian zones converted increase (moving from right to left). The first unit of wetland 
to be converted is usually inexpensive to drain and convert to annual crop production 
and will provide relatively high quality and productive soil for cropping production. As 
a result, the marginal benefit of converting the first unit of wetland is quite high as 
shown in the figure 3.1. As more and more wetland area is converted to agricultural 
production, the land quality will decrease, providing lower productivity per hectare of 
land converted. The marginal benefits of converting the next hectare of wetland 
becomes smaller and smaller, and ultimately reaches zero because land becomes hard 
to drain and land quality declines. In this model, it is assumed that the MBcp will 
intersect with the horizontal axis at Qcp indicating that some quantity of wetlands will 
still be conserved even in the absence of a policy of wetland conservation. At each 
point on the MBcp curve, the landowner will make a decision if an additional unit of 
wetland will be converted based on whether this marginal hectare provides a net 
benefit to them. Since benefits from conversion are usually considered as the earnings 
private landowner receive from cropping, if the income landowners receive from 
cropland is positive, conversion continues. Otherwise, conversion would be much 
slower. Since the remaining wetlands will cost the landowner too much to convert to 
crop due to either the poor quality of land or the difficulties involved in drainage, 
landowners will stop at the intersection point Qcp, in the absence of private benefits 
gained through wetland conservation.  
In figure 3.1, the slope of the MBcp curve measures the extent marginal 
benefits will change as an additional unit of wetland is converted. In most cases, 
theoretically, this curve is relatively flatter, since wetland conversion provides more 
intensive agricultural or developed uses and more returns to the individual landowner. 
However, in practice, the shape of the slope is largely dependent on the ease to convert 
wetlands and riparian areas based on the different soil quality of the specific landscape. 
In the real world, the relationship between changes in marginal benefit and conversion 
wetlands might not be a linear situation as described in the figure. The marginal 
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benefits for the first units of wetland to be converted might not decrease due to similar 
characteristics these wetlands possess. With a greater area of conversion, a threshold is 
reached where the marginal benefits would start to decrease fairly quickly because of 
the possible difficulties in draining and converting.  
The private demand for wetland and riparian area preservation is represented 
by MBpp5 (Figure 3.1) and represents the benefits a landowner will receive from 
conserving wetlands on their land. These benefits are mostly associated with on-site 
benefits such as personal recreational opportunities and aesthetic views of wildlife, 
direct monetary benefits may be available from haying, grazing, and fishing. 
Consistent with the discussion for MBcp, the net marginal benefits for wetland 
conservation decrease as the area of wetlands protected increase reflecting a standard 
demand model (moving from left to right). When a landowner possesses no wetlands 
in the landscape, the first unit of wetland will usually provide significant marginal 
benefits such as water, views of ducks and livestock forage. Therefore, the marginal 
benefit of the first unit preservation is quite high. With greater areas of wetlands 
conserved, the incremental benefit provided declines. At the point where the MBpp 
intersects with the horizontal axis at Qpp, the marginal benefit of wetland conservation 
becomes negative. This could be due to factors that decrease land productivity in the 
presence of wetlands such as crop pests, decreased field efficiency and high water 
tables (Whitten, 2003). Compared to the shape of MBcp, MBpp is relatively steeper 
since in this model, it is assumed that only limited benefits will be provided to 
individual landowners from wetland protection and thus marginal benefits decrease 
faster with more wetlands preserved. 
The optimal allocation of wetlands and riparian areas from a private 
landowner’s view is the point of land allocation where the marginal benefits from 
conserving wetlands equals the marginal benefits from converting wetlands. In figure 
3.1 this point is represented by Qp. At this point, the benefits landowners gain from 
                                                        
5 The marginal benefits are adjusted for direct costs of wetland conservation but not for indirect opportunity costs 
such as economic revenue from wetland conversion. Opportunity costs of wetland conservation are embodied in the 
marginal benefits of wetland conversion. 
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converting a marginal hectare of wetland is equal to the benefits available from 
retaining wetlands as is. If we assume foregone benefits being the costs, any further 
conversion activities would result in fewer benefits gained from conversion than 
foregone profits involved.                                                                
Due to the public good characteristic of ecosystem goods and services, 
protecting wetlands can provide significant social benefits, namely the benefits the 
individual landowners are able to specifically capture. Such social benefits constitute a 
large proportion of wetland amenity and could not be reflected in one individual’s 
account, including benefits such as flora and fauna habitat preservation, climate 
stabilization and groundwater recharge and discharge, etc. These benefits are 
non-excludable and as such, once they are supplied by the landowner, all society can 
receive benefits from the enjoyment of these goods and services. Thereby the current 
market does not possess a proper mechanism for landowners to capture such social 
benefits. As introduced before in section 3.2, the difference between social benefits and 
private benefits are defined as external benefits or more generally “externalities”. 
Adding these external benefits to private marginal benefits MBpp results in the 
significantly higher social marginal benefit for wetland preservation MBps (the dotted 
line). As depicted in figure 3.1, external benefits are represented by the area between 
MBpp and MBps. Denoted in equation, MBps = MBpp + external benefits.  
From society’s perspective, the socially optimum allocation of the stock of 
wetlands is determined by the point where the social marginal benefits for preserving 
and converting are equal, shown by Qs. From figure 3.1, it can be shown that point Qs 
is located to the right of the private optimum (Qp) quantity, indicating that too few 
wetlands are conserved in an unfettered market. To increase social welfare, more 
wetland and riparian areas must be conserved with less land allocated to agricultural 
production. Since external social benefits are not reflected in the market and as such, 
landowners fail to receive adequate incentives to increase wetland conservation to 
social optimal levels, government policies can be used to enable the market to provide 
the maximum social welfare.  
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Governmental involvement in the form of policy measures can include, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, a number of instrument options from education and technical 
assistance, economic incentives payment to mandatory regulations and policies. 
Economic incentive payments have been shown to be more efficient in many 
applications in encouraging wetland conservation and allowing landowners the 
flexibility to determine participation, it is chosen to represent an environmental policy 
showing how to narrow the gap between private and social optimal land allocation and 
how the externalities could be “internalized” by applying policy tools.  
For the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that an economic incentive is 
now introduced by the government with the intent to address the market failure in 
wetland allocation. The implemented policy provides monetary compensation to 
landowners who agree to protect wetlands and riparian zones for a period of time on 
their land. It is also assumed that this is the only policy measure the government 
implements at this time. Prior to the implementation of the policy, private landowners 
are only willing to supply Qp wetlands on their land and convert the remaining 
wetlands. After the policy is introduced, the marginal private benefits from protecting 
wetlands increase by DP’- DP since landowners are able to receive extra returns, in the 
form of incentive payments for their effort in providing wetlands goods and services. 
The increased returns afford landowners the incentive to provide more wetlands. As a 
result, the marginal benefit of wetland and riparian zones expands from MBpp to MBpp’ 
along with a consequent increase in wetland preserved from Qp to Qp’. The higher the 
monetary compensation, the more marginal benefits landowners will obtain from 
preserving wetlands and less wetland will be converted to agricultural production. If 
the economic incentive payment is set exactly equal to DS – DP as shown in figure 3.1, 
conservation will move from Qp to Qs where optimal wetland conservation level equals 
the social optimal level. At this point, external benefits provided by wetland and 
riparian conservation would be fully captured by individuals through the incentive 
payment and marginal social benefits will equal marginal social costs. If the 
compensation payment is less than DS – DP, it is unlikely that socially optimal 
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conservation market failure could be corrected.           
 
The model discussed above provides a general conceptual picture for 
understanding the allocation of land within an agricultural landscape. For individual 
landowners, they will stop converting wetlands when the marginal benefits of 
converting are equivalent to the marginal benefits of preserving. Due to the market 
inefficiency problem of wetlands, there exists a gap between the actual and the socially 
optimal allocation of land between remaining and converted wetland. To minimize the 
divergence, policy measures can be implemented.  
3.4 Summary 
The non-market goods and services wetlands produce for society are important 
and are valued by society. Wetlands constitute an essential support system and are 
argued to deserve recognition and protection actions. The loss and degradation of 
wetlands that has occurred within agricultural landscape has been interpreted as a 
market failure. This market failure has been explained due to the public nature of 
wetlands, poorly defined property rights, limited awareness and externalities. With the 
purpose to address the full economic picture of wetland benefits and to enable 
landowners to capitalize on the social benefits wetlands produce, government 
intervention is often implemented. Provided that economic incentives are an effective 
and flexible way to encourage wetland conservation, it has been focused in this chapter 
to explore the function of policy in achieving social optimum land distribution.  
In order to correctly value the net external benefits and estimate efficient 
economic incentives to reach the socially optimal level of wetland conservation, 
non-market valuation techniques described in next chapter are applied. In economics, 
measurement could be accomplished by estimating landowner’s willingness to accept 
(WTA), which is a mechanism to quantify individual’s utility in terms of their stated 
preference. More information concerning WTA use in deciding economic incentives is 
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presented in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH MATERIALS AND METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
The agricultural region of southern Saskatchewan is where the conversion and 
destruction of wetlands and the decrease of the provision of wetland goods and 
services represents a significant problem. Two study sites were selected within this 
area for more extensive analysis of wetland conservation activities. Applying the 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3, this chapter will develop a specific case 
study to assess the economic incentive payment required to encourage landowners to 
adopt wetland conservation management on agricultural land. A willingness to accept 
(WTA) method is applied in the current research to achieve this goal. The targeted 
study area is described in the next section, followed by a discussion of the survey 
methods and procedures. A mathematical framework for assessing an individual 
landowner’s utility is then introduced to represent landowner’s choice of conserving 
wetland habitat in return for financial assistance, based on random utility maximization 
theory. Finally the chapter concludes with a description of the research survey.        
4.2 Description of Wetlands in Saskatchewan 
4.2.1 Geographical Information 
       The province of Saskatchewan is well known for its flat southern plain which 
was glaciated during the last ice age. Over 50 percent of the province is covered by 
forest and approximately 30 percent of the land is cultivated for agricultural use and 
over 12 percent is covered with water (Canada facts, 2008). Across the province, the 
distribution, size and the shape of wetlands have largely been determined by the 
characteristics of the glacial landscape (Huel, 2000).  
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Saskatchewan has been classified into eleven natural ecoregions from north to 
south (Figure 4.1). A variety of soil types in the southern half of the province, 
primarily brown, dark brown and black, corresponding to the mixed grassland, moist 
mixed grassland, and aspen parkland ecoregions, respectively, are highly suitable to 
the production of various food and fibre commodities (Huel, 2000).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Saskatchewan ecoregions map 
Source: Virtual Saskatchewan (2008) 
 
The climate of southern Saskatchewan is characterized by extremes in 
temperature from cold winters to hot, dry summers. The amount of rainfall ranges from 
30 cm (about 12 in) to 43 cm (17 in), with the driest part being in the southwest and far 
north (Saskschools, 2008). The combination of climate and the geographic condition of 
the province combine to make this area one of the most productive waterfowl habitat 
regions in North America. Over 150 species of birds and animals are known to make 
their home in Saskatchewan wetlands (Huel, 2000). Wetlands such as lakes, flats and 
marsh habitats, along with upland nesting habitats represent critical natural resources 
for the success of migratory bird species.  
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4.2.2 Saskatchewan Wetland Status 
PPR wetlands are concentrated in the southern portions of the three prairie 
provinces in Canada - Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba (Natural Resource Canada, 
2007). These wetland regions usually suffer from low precipitation and long periods of 
drought. In general, PPR wetlands are relatively small in size. Several types of 
wetlands are recognized based on Saskatchewan climate conditions and vegetation 
(Huel, 2000; Mitra et al. 2003; Schuyt and Brander, 2004). For the present study, 
wetlands are divided into two categories, permanent and seasonal wetlands, 
distinguished primarily by the length of time that these basins hold water into the 
summer following the spring runoff. Permanent wetlands are defined as any water 
body that typically contains open water through the summer in most years, while 
seasonal wetlands hold water only into the late spring or early summer in most years.  
In Saskatchewan, wetlands not only support a variety of plant species but 
function as part of a complex and intricate hydrological system (Huel, 2000). Wetlands 
and surrounding plant communities are important links between atmospheric, surface 
and groundwater movements. The cumulative effect of wetlands on climate is crucial 
in determining the amount of precipitation in Saskatchewan (Huel, 2000).  
4.3 Research Procedures and Methods 
4.3.1 Study Area   
The current research is part of larger interdisciplinary research project 
directed by Ducks Unlimited Canada in conjunction with the Advancing Canadian 
Agriculture and Agri-Food (ACAAF). The two study sites targeted for this research 
were selected for the larger project to meet its objective biophysical data are Statistics 
Canada Census Agriculture Region (CAR) 8B and 3AN (Figure 4.2). Both of the study 
areas lie within prairie ecozones and fall within the PPR of North America.  
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Figure 4.2 The study regions in relation to the soil zones 
Source: CRERL (2009) 
 
The first study area is located in the Statistics Canada Census Agriculture 
Region 8B (figure 4.2). The total cultivated land base in this agricultural region (Figure 
4.3) is approximately 1 million hectares and cropping area is about 774,790 hectares 
(Statistics Canada, 2006a). This agricultural region falls within three ecoregions: the 
Aspen Parkland Ecoregion, the Moist Mixed grassland Ecoregion and the Boreal 
Transition Ecoregion. Dark brown and black soil are the two major soil types in this 
study region which have high levels of organic matter at the surface and are thus dark 
or black in color (The Encyclopedia of Saskatchewan, 2008). The lowland and plains 
of this area have been mostly cultivated for agriculture production. Native vegetation 
of this area was characterized by mid-grass species and shrubs. The dominant 
vegetations around wetlands are sedges, rushes and trees such as trembling aspen, 
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balsam poplar and willow (Hogan and Conly, 2002). The climate here is extreme. 
Temperatures extremes vary greatly between seasons, ranging from +40℃ in summer 
to -50℃ in winter. The average daily temperature in July is 18℃ while the average 
daily temperature in January is -17℃ (Environment Canada, 2009). The majority of 
the precipitation is summer rainfall between May and September, with the peak in July.  
 
Figure 4.3 CAR 8B 
The second area, CAR 3AN, is situated in the brown soil zone (Figure 4.2). 
Total area of farm land within this CAR is about 0.8 million hectares with half of the 
area used for annual crop production (Figure 4.4). This study area falls within the 
Mixed Grassland Ecoregion which is found in the southwest part of the province. This 
is the driest ecoregion in the province with a mixture of mid-grass species such as 
wheat grasses and short-grasses such as blue gramma (The Encyclopedia of 
Saskatchewan, 2008). The relatively dry climate and low precipitation has imposed 
severe limitations to agricultural production. Extreme temperatures range from +42℃ 
in summer to -47℃ in winter. The average daily temperature in July is 19℃ while the 
average daily temperature in January is -13℃ (Environment Canada, 2009). Water 
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conservation management practices such as summerfallow are more commonly 
practiced in this area. However, many small wetland areas or sloughs occur throughout 
this region, although the density, permanence and characteristics of the wetlands are 
different than in the more humid landscape in CAR 8B.  
 
Figure 4.4 CAR 3AN 
A comparison of demographic and physical characteristics of the two study 
areas is summarized in table 4.1. Different soil characteristics, temperature and climate 
account for distinct vegetation composition and farming management regimes within 
the two areas. With greater precipitation (and lower evapotranspiration), water is less 
limiting in CAR 8B resulting in higher biomass and more diverse vegetation species. 
These wetter conditions also result in greater amount of wetlands and riparian areas 
found in 8B than in 3AN. 
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Table 4.1. Demographic and physical characteristics of the two study areas 
Study 
area 
Populationa Area (ha) a Rainfall 
(cm/yr)b Soil type  Land use Farm Total Farm Total 
8B 3,135 23,657 1,009,356 1,092,400 42 Dark brown 
Black soils 
Forestry 
Grassland 
Farmland 
3AN 1,435 5,240 806,871 933,000 35.2 Brown soils Grassland 
Farmland 
a Statistics Canada (2006a) 
b Environment Canada (2009) 
 
The two study areas are chosen to reflect variations of wetland landscape in 
agricultural region within the PPR in Saskatchewan. These study sites were selected 
because of their similar management history and extensive database (vegetation, land 
use, GHG flux etc.) within two regions. Both sites were felt to be relatively 
representative in reflecting Saskatchewan land use. In addition, analysis developed for 
these two soil type and climate regions enable the results to be interpreted for the 
broader prairie landscape. The next section will provide a description of the research 
methods applied to develop wetland management plan adoption analysis. 
4.3.2 Research Method 
4.3.2.1 Incentive-Based Policy 
Among the wide range of policy instrument options discussed in the previous 
chapter, economic incentive programs are often considered more effective than 
educational assistance and more flexible than regulation to meet environmental goals. 
Under incentive programs, landowners are free to compare the incentives they receive 
and the costs they would incur due to the changed management practice. This process 
on one side assists landowners to choose the most profitable private management plan 
before participation and, on the other side, directs agri-environmental activities to the 
most cost-effective farms (Cuddington, 2008).  
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In this study, a proposed economic incentive program is aimed at conserving 
and restoring wetlands and riparian zones in Western Canada. The proposed program 
provides financial payment as the primary incentive to induce conservation activities 
while technical and educational assistance is also provided through the program to help 
offset some of the transaction costs imposed on landowners who adopt the 
conservation program. In order to ensure wetland and riparian area conservation and to 
be consistent with existing conservation programs (U.S. Conservation Reserves 
Program (CRP), Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), and Canadian Greencover 
Program), a 10-year commitment period is proposed in this research. 
4.3.2.2 Contingent Valuation Method 
In developing effective programs that provide financial incentives to 
landowners to adopt conservation management, it is important to effectively measure 
the amount of incentives that are required to meet ecological objectives. This 
information will help improve conservation participation rates while ensuring an 
efficient use of limited public funding. However, quantifying the optimal value of the 
incentive can be extremely difficult. Both private and social benefits and costs 
associated with use and non-use values must be properly estimated. According to 
Shaikh et al. (2007), the difficulty and uncertainty in determining the incentives for 
wetland conservation could be summarized as follows; 1) the costs of providing 
wetland and riparian zones within agricultural fields are unclear due to the geological 
and local precipitation difference; 2) landowners will worry about the risk that results 
from the reduced capacity to produce agricultural commodities and decreased land use 
flexibility; 3) landowners’ preference and knowledge of environment protection 
activities are heterogeneous.  
To assess the cost of landowner adoption of conservation management of 
agricultural wetlands and to quantify the required level of payment required to 
encourage adoption, non-market approaches can be used. Foregone profit generated 
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from agricultural production is considered one way to represent landowners’ cost of 
conservation. However, it is an incomplete measure. Although the foregone profit from 
producing agricultural commodities constitutes an important part of the cost, the total 
financial compensation required by the landowner might be influenced by many other 
factors such as the opportunity cost (land rent), personal preference, the difficulty of 
managing wetlands or retirement status. Furthermore, economic incentive amounts 
could also be affected by landowners’ risk attitude, length of contract period and 
different transaction costs expected (Shaikh et al. 2007).  
The most common approach presently applied to value wetland benefits 
including both use and non-use values is the Contingent Valuation Method. This 
approach has been used numerous times in related studies to reflect the respondents’ 
preference for non-market goods. CVM is valuable in this context since it reveals 
landowners’ personal preference for increments or decrements of unpriced wetland 
services by using a contingent market (King and Mazzotta, 2000). The method is used 
because some wetland amenities that need to be valued are assumed to leave no 
behavioral trail for economists to employ, in other words, landowners’ willingness for 
wetland goods and services are unable to be discovered through their purchases or by 
their behavior. An appropriate option to estimate its value is by exploring their stated 
preference. In current research, landowners were asked explicitly about their WTA 
compensation for participation in a wetland and riparian conservation program. This 
method is able to incorporate both wetland non-market values and landowners’ risk 
attitudes into the financial compensation amount.  
Although CVM has been largely accepted and applied, there still exist 
considerable criticisms as to whether it sufficiently measures people's valuation for 
public goods and services, as discussed in section 2.4.3. In order to collect useful data 
and provide meaningful results, proper design of the contingent device (survey) and 
effective pre-tests are needed to minimize biases and to make WTA an appropriate 
tool to measure wetland values. Some key issues in the construction of accurate and 
effective survey instruments have been identified by previous CVM literatures 
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(Hanemann, 1994; King and Mazzotta, 2000): a) consider people’s familiarity with 
the goods or services before designing the survey; b) provide an accurate and clear 
description of the environmental services associated with the event, program, 
payment policy and length of contract etc; c) ask questions in a close-ended format6 
rather than open-ended format; d) avoid bringing respondents a high-pressure 
interview situation; e) provide definitions of important terms to eliminate any 
possible confusion that may cause respondents to inappropriately value the goods or 
services. In the present survey, all of these issues were considered and techniques 
were applied in the survey designing and data collecting process. Specific survey 
implementation details are provided in section 4.3.3. 
4.3.2.3 A Model Framework for the Adoption Behavior of Landowner 
When a landowner is confronted with the decision to adopt a wetland 
conservation program with economic payment, as questioned in the survey, he is 
assumed to choose the action that maximizes his utility. A common approach used to 
develop this model is based on the discrete choice random utility maximization (RUM) 
theory (Hanemann, 1984; Train, 2003). Discrete choice modeling usually involves 
choices between two or more discrete alternatives to quantify the impact of variations 
on the choice by using statistical models. The discrete choice format is used in this 
study to capture landowner’s decisions in terms of the opportunity to provide particular 
wetland conservation actions on the agriculture land and to estimate how the various 
attributes’ influence the landowners’ decisions. RUM is the theory that is widely 
adopted in the discrete choice model for application. It is developed based on the 
assumption that the landowner knows their utility function with certainty and is a 
well-informed decision maker capable of choices the alternative that provides the 
greatest utility. Rather than using the individual’s maximum profit function to explore 
                                                        
6 Questions could be asked either in open-ended format or close-ended format. In open-ended format, respondents 
are asked to make up their own WTP or WTA for the environmental improvement. While in a close-ended format, a 
specific amount is usually provided for the WTP and WTA question and the participants are only allowed to choose 
from a pre-existing set of discrete answers such as yes or no. 
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the effects of various incentives to induce conservation activities, the discrete choice 
model estimates by comparing the extent of landowners’ willingness to preserve 
wetlands with offered incentives.  
Now it is assumed that a landowner is willing to take steps to conserve 
wetlands and riparian zones on the land under the condition that the utility provided by 
participating in the conservation actions is at least as great as the next best alternative 
land allocation. It is also assumed that this landowner’s expected direct utility can be 
represented as ),,( symu , where m  indicates the conservation choice. m=0 if the 
landowner refuses the policy incentive offer and keeps converting wetlands and 
associated riparian zones to agricultural production, and m=1 if the landowner accepts 
the offer and agrees to conserve wetlands within the agricultural landscape. y 
represents the individual’s income and s is a vector to measure those additional 
uncertain attributes that may have an effect on landowner’s acceptance choice such as 
personal characteristics, individual preference and land quality. Based on Hanemann’s 
theory (1984), the outcome of the decision is probabilistic and includes some 
unobservable components that are hard for economic researchers to account for. The 
attributes the decision maker has in determining the alternative choices is only partly 
observed. Therefore we assume that the individual’s utility function ),,( symu could be 
specified as an indirect utility function ),,( symv  and an additional independent and 
identically distributed (iid) error term mε  with zero mean, capturing factors that have 
impacts on u but not included inv , such that  
           msymvsymu ε+= ),,(),,(                                (1) 
Now assuming an economic incentive payment, P is introduced to encourage 
wetland conservation. Utility maximization theory reflects the condition that the 
landowner knows with certainty with which land allocation choice maximize utility. 
The individual will be willing to conserve wetlands with encouragement of payment P 
if he is at least not worse off with the incentives than without such as to keep the utility 
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level unchanged. The impacts of this economic payment P on the landowner could be 
reflected as (Hanemann, 1984; Kinsbury and Boggess, 1999; Cooper and Keim, 1996): 
     10 ),,1(),,0( εε ++≤+ sPyvsyv                          (2) 
The minimum required incentive payment is determined by the amount that 
will make the landowner indifferent between accepting the bid and conserving the 
wetland, and maintaining the status quo. When 1100 εε +<+ vv , the wetland 
conservation management will be accepted by the landowner. When 1100 εε +=+ vv , 
the landowner is indifferent between the choices. Otherwise landowners will reject the 
policy offer. 
If we further assume the functional form of v  is 
)0(),,( >+′= ααβ yssymv m                    1,0=m     (3) 
then the landowners’ decision to conserve wetlands (2) could be rewritten as: 
1100 )('' εαβεαβ +++≤++ Pysys                    
⇒ Pss αββεε +−≤− 0110 ''                               (4) 
where s is a vector of various attributes that affect the landowners’ choice, 
β is the coefficient of the attributes, P is the offered economic incentives and α is the 
coefficient of P. 
Since the individual’s utility is a random variable, the probability form would 
be more analytically convenient to reflect landowners’ decision to adopt the 
conservation activities. Usually the probability of 0.5 is set to stand for the indifference 
response in order to solve for the median incentive payment P (Kinsburry and Boggess 
1999). Following Hanemann (1984) and Kinsburry and Boggess (1999), this 
probability form of equation (2) can be expressed as: 
     )),,1(),,0(()1( 10 εε ++≤+== sPyvsyvprobmprob          
               = )( 1100 εε +≤+ vvprob  
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               = )( 0110 vvprob −≤−εε )( vF Δ= Δε              (5) 
     )1(1)0( =−== mprobmprob  
where Pssvvv αββ +−=Δ=− 0101 '' , and )( vF ΔΔε is a cumulative 
distribution function for each random term 10 εε −  evaluated at the observed quantity 
01 vv − (Train, 2003).  
Different assumptions about the distribution of the unobserved part of utility 
( εΔ ) result in different discrete choice models. The two most popular probability 
density functions used for estimating landowner’s propensity to participate in the 
conservation alternatives are the probit and logit models. If the normal distribution is 
assumed, the model is called the probit model while if the distribution is logistic, the 
model is called the logit model. It should be noted that while a linear probability model 
is another alternative approach, the significant shortcoming of this model include its 
heteroscedasticity of error term ε and it does not constrain the probability of 
landowners’ choice decision between 0 and 1 which is required by the probability 
theory. In the present research, F  is assumed to be standard normal distribution and 
yields the probit model7.  
 
An individual landowner’s decision to participate in the program, as can be 
seen from discussion, is the outcome of a utility-maximizing plan over two alternatives. 
For the conservation program to be implemented in an area, it needs to take into 
account a large group of landowners’ choices together to increase supply of wetland 
benefits supply. Each landowner decides on a self-interested course of action in view 
of individual circumstances and objectives. Therefore, the socially optimal allocation 
of wetlands requires the simultaneous compatibility of the disparate plans of a large 
                                                        
7 The probability of m=1 can be computed from the standard normal CDF as 
∫∫
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Since Pssv αββ +−=Δ 01 '' is generated directly from the utility model given, it is consistent with the 
theory of maximization. 
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number of different landowners (Jehle and Reny, 2001). 
Let N=｛1,2,…n｝represent an index of the set of individual landowners and 
),,,(, nnmn sPymq be landowner n’s nonnegative supply of wetland as a function of their 
conservation choice m, income y, offered economic incentives P and personal 
attributes s. The market supply of wetlands through the conservation program is simply 
the sum of all landowners’ wetland supply and could be represented as 
∑
Ν∈
≡
n
nnmn sPymqQ ),,( ,,        
Q gives the total amount of wetlands all landowners in the market would like to 
conserve and supply.  
4.3.3 Research Implementation 
Given the above discussed methodology, the present study developed a survey 
instrument to examine landowners’ willingness to accept the proposed wetland and 
riparian area management plan. In order to minimize the difficulty and to ensure 
survey language and format could be easily understood by respondents, terminology 
and scenarios were clearly interpreted, respondents were able to answer the questions 
as they were originally intended, and early drafts of the survey were thoroughly 
pilot-tested with Saskatchewan landowners to improve results. 
A total of 4110 survey questionnaires were mailed out in July, 2007, to all 
registered farms located in two study regions--CAR 8B and 3AN--by unaddressed mail. 
Post cards were sent out three weeks after the first mailing as a reminder. The survey 
included a brief personalized cover letter explaining the purpose of the questionnaire 
and participation rules and a prize draw form valued CAD $200, which was intended 
to help increase the effective response rate. The whole survey consisted of about 30 
questions and was expected to be completed by landowners within 15 minutes (See 
Appendix A for a copy of the survey questionnaire). 
A willingness to accept (WTA) question was included in the survey which 
focused on restoring and maintaining wetland and riparian zones in agricultural 
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regions of Western Canada. An illustration depicting an agricultural field with a 
riparian area was included to ensure the description of the topic was clear. This WTA 
question proposed a ten year wetland and riparian management program that covers 
landowners’ costs of wetland conservation while compensating for lost agricultural 
production. During the ten year program contract period, it was stated that both 
financial and technical assistance were expected to be provided to landowners who 
maintain permanently vegetated riparian zones around wetland within agricultural 
fields. The bid compensation range for this study was selected on the basis of previous 
studies concerning economic incentive-based environmental program and the pilot test. 
Ten annual payment values were proposed ranging from $10/acre ($24.7/ha) to 
$55/acre ($135.9/ha), with increments of $5. With the close-ended, format the 
respondent was simply asked to provide a “yes” or “no” answer to a single bid 
question (Appendix A Question 9)—“The program would provide farmers with an 
annual $50 (for example) per acre payment based on the area that is allocated to 
permanent riparian vegetation. Would you accept this program payment to restore 
and/or maintain riparian areas around wetlands on your land?” The bid amount was 
randomly assigned to survey respondents in an attempt to ensure that equal responses 
would be returned for each value. In addition to WTA compensation for wetland 
conservation, the survey also elicited detailed information on landowners’ personal 
profile, agricultural operations, landowners’ opinion about functions of wetland and 
riparian areas and their planning of farm management. Such information was collected 
to assist in assessing the impact of various farm and landowner characteristics on the 
magnitude of the economic incentive payment required. Survey demographic results 
were compared with appropriate data from Canada’s 2006 Census of Agriculture to 
evaluate how representative the survey sample was. The results are presented in the 
following chapter. 
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4.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided the biophysical background information of wetlands 
located in the province of Saskatchewan and introduced the study areas that were 
adopted for investigating landowners’ wetland conservation decisions. In order to 
quantify the amount of economic incentives needed to encourage wetland conservation, 
landowners’ decisions have been examined from a utility theoretic standpoint. If the 
utility landowners receive economic incentives and conserving wetlands is at least as 
great as the original status, they will decide to accept the program offer. If not, they 
will refuse the offer. WTA is applied in the exploration process as the tool to elicit 
individual’s utility in terms of their stated preference. In the next chapter, a discussion 
of the survey results and an explanation of the empirical model are presented to 
examine the policy in encouraging wetland conservation and factors that may 
influence the management of wetlands with the acquired data. 
 
 77 
CHAPTER 5  RESULTS AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have provided the theoretical and research 
background to evaluate the cost of wetland and riparian area conservation within 
agricultural landscapes. The aim of this chapter is to link the theoretical model to the 
two study areas in Saskatchewan in order to investigate the policy for efficient land 
allocation. The chapter analyzes the characteristics of landowners and geographical 
factors that may affect their participation choice. An investigation is also conducted to 
evaluate economic incentives as a policy tool to induce landowners to maintain 
wetland and riparian zones on privately owned agricultural land.  
This chapter begins with an explanation of the survey results. A description of 
the empirical model that includes specific variables that detail what each variable is 
designed to measure. Following this two different econometric regression models are 
estimated based on responses to the WTA question in the survey with results provided 
in section 5.4. A discussion of the empirical model results will be presented in next 
section. Finally, the chapter ends with a summary. 
5.2 Survey Results 
A total of 4110 surveys were mailed out to the landowners in the study areas 
in July 2007. The overall effective response rate was 6.1 percent which is low but is 
consistent with similar studies (Shaikh et al. 2007; van Kooten et al. 2002;) using mail 
out survey to farms in prairie regions. The methods for the mail out did not enable the 
quantification of surveys not delivered or delivered to ineligible households. Therefore, 
the actual response rate may be higher if all survey destinations could be defined. 
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Between the two regions, CAR 8B which is located in the dark brown/ black soil area, 
had a higher response rate (6.5 percent) than CAR 3AN (5.2 percent), located in brown 
soil zone. It is suspected that this is primarily due to harvest operations in the southern 
area starting unusually early in 2007 compared to harvest initiation in the central 
apportions of the province. As a result, landowners in CAR 3AN had less time and 
greater work conflicts to finish the survey.  
Personal and demographic information from the survey were compared with 
equivalent parameters from Canada’s 2006 Census of Agriculture to evaluate the 
consistency of the sample population with the provincial population (Table 5.1). 
Despite the low survey response rates, the differences between the survey population 
and the census age, off-farm income, and education data were not statistically 
significant. The average farm size reported by survey landowners was comparable to 
the Saskatchewan farm size, which has the largest average farm size in Canada. 
Average age of landowners in both study areas was approximately 50 years old and the 
average level of education was high school. The percentage of landowners with 
off-farm income in CAR 8B was slightly higher (7 percent) than that of CAR 3AN. 
For those farms with a single operator, only 11 percent indicated that the management 
of their farm would be taken over by someone in the family if they retired within next 
10 years, 46 percent reported no and 42 percent were unsure. Nearly 20 percent of the 
landowners were uncertain about how long they will continue to farm. These uncertain 
farm management plans may influence landowners’ decision to accept environmental 
conservation policies.    
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Table 5.1 Comparison of survey data with Census Canada (N represents sample size) 
Characteristic 8B (N) a 3AN(N) a All(N) a SK  Canada  
Average Age 52.97 (157) 53.98 (55) 53.24 (212) 52.6 b 52 b 
Average Education High School 
Diploma 
(157) 
High School 
Diploma  
(55) 
High School 
Diploma 
(212) 
High 
School 
Diplomac 
High 
School 
Diplomac
Landowners with Off-farm 
income (%) 
58 (157)   51 (55)  56 (212) 48.3 b 48.4 b 
Average Farm size (ha) 682 (151)  820 (55) 718 (206) 587d 295d 
a Original data obtained from the survey of Saskatchewan landowners in 8B and 3AN  
b Statistics Canada (2006b)  
c Statistics Canada (2006c) 
d Statistics Canada (2006a) 
 
 
To quantify the necessary financial incentives to induce the adoption of a 
wetland conservation program a WTA question was included in the survey. A discrete 
single bid approach was applied to this question which requires a large sample size to 
develop the distribution of all the bid levels. The results from the survey showed that 
42 percent of all respondents (89 out of 212) accepted the proposed program bid, 18 
percent respondents (38 out of 212) directly refused the program offer and remaining 
40 percent respondents (85 out of 212) did not complete the WTA question (Table 5.2). 
The proportion of acceptance responses at each bid level, even though it did not 
strictly increase as the bid value rose (particularly in CAR 3AN), suggested an overall 
higher acceptance rate at a higher bid level and showed a 50 percent or so acceptance 
rate, if compensation value was greater than or equal to $30/acre ( $74.1/ha). The 
jumps in the response rate numbers (particularly in CAR 3AN) were mainly due to the 
relatively small sample size this survey received. Landowners in CAR 3AN showed 
more interest in the financial compensation payment (52.7 percent) than landowners in 
CAR 8B (38.2 percent) (Table 5.3). Except the $25 and $45 level, at all other bid 
levels the acceptance rate of WTA question in 3AN was higher than that in 8B. This 
result encouraged examination of the impact of landscape characteristics on adoption 
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of conservation programs. A detailed analysis will be presented in the following 
sections. 
In order to determine the reasons why certain landowners did not accept the 
program offer, their attitude towards the program and wetlands was analyzed based on 
their comments and answers to other survey questions. For those respondents who 
directly said no to the bid offer, the reason was largely because of their perception that 
insufficient financial compensation was provided (indicated by the comments). For the 
remaining 40 percent of the respondents who did not complete the WTA question, the 
source of this uncertainty mainly came from concerns with wetland management (e.g. 
too many ducks and geese, land clearing investments, etc.) and changes in personal 
status (e.g. retirement, farm sale, etc.), even though the majority were in favor of 
environmental conservation (according to landowners’ comments). In addition, the 
greater available water that landowners’ in CAR 8B had experienced in the year when 
the survey was conducted was likely an important reason they were hesitant to 
implement a wetland conservation program. 
Table 5.2 WTA response rate by bid category 
Bid category Yes response No response N/A response
All 
respondents 
Acceptance 
rate 
$10 8 10 14 32 25.0% 
$15 8 5 4 17 47.0% 
$20 6 6 9 21 28.6% 
$25 10 7 13 30 33.3% 
$30 11 3 7 21 52.4% 
$35 8 0 9 17 47.0% 
$40 9 2 6 17 52.9% 
$45 10 1 9 20 50.0% 
$50 10 2 6 18 55.6% 
$55 9 2 8 19 47.4% 
Total 89 38 85 212 42.0% 
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Table 5.3 WTA acceptance rate of two study areas at each bid level 
Bid category 8B 3AN 
$10 18.0% 40.0% 
$15 46.2% 50.0% 
$20 13.3% 66.7% 
$25 36.4% 25.0% 
$30 50.0% 100.0% 
$35 38.5% 75.0% 
$40 37.5% 66.7% 
$45 53.3% 40.0% 
$50 50.0% 100.0% 
$55 46.2% 50.0% 
Total 38.2% 52.7% 
5.3 Econometric Model Specification 
5.3.1 The Basic model 
The model specification portion of this study provides a detailed examination 
of the various characteristics and factors that influence landowner adoption of the 
wetland conservation program. Using a stated preference approach, landowners’ WTA 
has been elicited to estimate the level of financial incentive needed to encourage 
conservation adoption.  
In the model, the dependent variable is the landowners’ WTA the program 
payment to restore and maintain wetland and riparian area on their private land. Since 
about 40 percent of respondents did not answer the WTA wetland conservation 
question, analysis of these non-respondents was developed to provide additional 
information. Rather than ignoring these non-respondent answers, this study estimates 
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two different econometric models (Lynch et al. 2002; Train, 2003). The first model is a 
binary probit model which considers the non-respondent answers as missing values 
and only includes those “yes” and “no” answers for analysis. To code these responses 
the models equate “yes” with 1 and “no” with 0. The second model specification is a 
multinomial probit model that takes the non-respondent answers into account and 
assumes that landowners answered the question on the basis of the level of utility each 
choice brings. The dependent variable has been divided into three categories, with 
“no”=0, N/A response=1 and “yes”=2. If the landowner chose “yes” in the survey, then 
it is assumed that accepting the offer and conserving wetlands brings the landowner 
greater utility (u) than the other choices. If the landowners did not answer the question, 
it means that neither accepting nor refusing the offer will produce any more utility for 
them, then a N/A answer would be given. There are many reasons respondents may not 
have answered the WTA question such as they are indifferent between accepting the 
program or not, they lack sufficient knowledge background to complete the question or, 
they are uncertain about future management plans as discussed in section 5.1. The 
decision is represented as 
2=iY  (willing to accept)    if 102 ,uuu >  
1=iY   (N/A response)      if 201 ,uuu >  
0=iY  (unwilling to accept)  if 210 ,uuu >  
where ui are true utility level for corresponding stated preference Yi.      
 In this analysis, the estimation of two different models enables the regression 
results to be compared to provide further information for analysis concerning the 
impact of various characteristics on the landowners’ decision. Specifically, it enables 
an analysis of the impact of attitudinal characteristics on those respondents who do not 
complete the WTA question8.  
                                                        
8 An ordered probit model which assumes that a natural ordering exists in the discrete choices is also estimated 
during the research process. This model does not perform as well as the multinomial probit model. And according to 
the conclusion drawn by Lori et al. (2002), it is not appropriate to put “don’t know” answers as a middle group 
indicating a middle utility level. 
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5.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
This section details the specific explanatory variables used in the econometric 
model. The explanatory variables chosen for this study are selected on the basis of 
previously published research discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2) concerning 
adoption of environmental conservation management plans. Some additional variables 
are also included in the model because they have been found to influence or are 
hypothesized to affect the wetland and riparian area conservation plan adoption. 
Specific information is provided below. 
5.3.2.1 Data Selection 
 The survey data has been applied in the study to conduct an econometric 
analysis of the influence of demographic and attitudinal characteristics on wetland 
conservation management decisions. Given the large number of parameters included in 
the survey, there are many possible ways to specify the model. As such, it is important 
to select those variables that are most appropriate for the research question. The 
selection of explanatory (independent) variables in the current regression model has 
been initially implemented in SPSS v.16 using a backward elimination approach for 
non-linear models to help determine the most relevant independent variables. This 
approach has been intensively used in related research (Wu et al. 2000; Wu et al. 2002; 
Shaikh et al. 2007). In backward elimination, the model begins with all variables 
included and then removes variables from the model one at a time (Zellner et al. 2004). 
This is done by calculating the Likelihood-ratio (LR) statistics and significance for all 
variables included and then by comparing the significance of the most insignificant 
variable in the full model with the probability criterion for a variable removal process. 
If the significance of the variable is larger, the model is modified by dropping this most 
insignificant variable and keeps repeating the steps to estimate the modified model. 
The procedure continues until only one variable is left in the model or until all 
variables in the model meet the criterion to stay. In this study, 0.1 was used as the 
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significance level to maintain a variable in the backward elimination procedure. It 
should be noted that forward selection is an alternative variable selection process that 
adds variables to the model one by one instead of dropping. The drawback of this 
method is that it cannot take into account the situation when two variables together can 
explain the variation of the model if either variable individually is not useful enough 
since forward selection only adds one variable at a time. Backward selection does not 
have such a problem since it already contains both variables and will not drop either 
one of them (Rogue Wave Software, 1999; Zellner et al. 2004). 
Based on the selection results provided by the backward elimination approach, 
fourteen variables were retained in the final model. However, some parameters of 
interest were removed during the elimination process and some of those excluded 
variables were expected to have a practical impact on landowners’ participation 
decisions according to past experience. In order to examine the potential influence of 
such explanatory variables on the dependent WTA variable, six additional variables 
were chosen on the basis of the results from previous published research were also 
included in the final model for regression analysis and further discussion.  
5.3.2.2 Description of Variables 
 The relationship between landowners’ willingness to participate in the wetland 
conservation management program and the economic incentive payment offered is 
hypothesized to be conditioned on four categories of explanatory variables, a) farm 
variables, b) landowners’ preference, c) past experience and d) demographic and 
sociological variables (Table 5.4). A description of each variable included in the 
econometric model, detailed explanation of the variable and the expected relationship 
is provided in the following discussion.  
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Table 5.4 Variables expected to influence the participation decision 
Categories & Variables Variable Description 
Dependent  
WTIWB Willing to conserve wetland and riparian zones in private land—Binary 
(1= yes, 0= no) 
WTIWM Willing to conserve wetland and riparian zones in private 
land—Multinomial (2= yes, 1 =N/A, 0 = no) 
Independent  
PAYMENT Annual Payment per acre for participation in the program 
Farm  
SOIL* Soil type of the farm (1= brown soil zone, 2= dark brown/black) 
GRAIN* Proportion of land holdings allocated to grain production (%) 
ACRES Farm acres owned (farm size) 
Wetland Preference  
PESTS Wetlands harbor undesirable pests (-1=disagree, 0=neutral, 1=agree) 
AESTHETIC Wetlands are pleasing to see (-1= disagree, 0=neutral, 1=agree) 
EROSION Wetlands help erosion control (-1=disagree, 0=neutral, 1=agree) 
 
COSTLY* Wetlands are costly to maintain (-1=disagree, 0=neutral, 1=agree) 
WILDLIFE Wetlands are important for wildlife (-1=disagree, 0=neutral, 1=agree) 
EQUIP Wetlands make field operations more difficult and/or expensive 
(-1=disagree, 0=neutral, 1=agree) 
BENEFIT Benefits of wetlands > disadvantages (-1=disagree, 0=neutral, 1=agree)
Past Experience  
DRAINED Drained wetlands within last 10 years (1=yes, 0=no) 
PERM Currently maintain riparian areas around permanent wetlands (1=yes, 
0=no) 
SEASON Currently maintain riparian areas around seasonal wetlands (1=yes, 
0=no) 
MNGTPL Have completed a management plan for farm (1=yes, 0=no) 
Demographic &Sociological 
AGE* Age of the primary farm operator (years) 
EDUC* Completed education (1=primary/secondary, 2=high school, 3= 
college, 4=bachelor’s, 5= graduate) 
OFFINC*  Off-farm income (1=yes, 0=no) 
MNGTM Length of time the operator managing farm (years) 
HEIR Respondent expects a heir to continue farming (1=yes, 0=otherwise) 
* Variables added to the model after backward selection process 
Source: Original data obtained from a survey of Saskatchewan landowners 
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 The dependent variable used in the econometric model was the landowners’ 
decision to accept the wetland and riparian area conservation program payment. Since 
two different regression models were developed, two groups of dependent variables 
are defined. WTIWB is the dependent variable adopted in the binary probit model for 
which non-respondents were considered missing values. WTIWM is the dependent 
variable for multinomial probit model which took non-respondents into consideration 
and divided the WTA answers into three separate groups (Table 5.4).  
 PAYMENT represents the level of per acre annual financial incentives the 
program provides for landowners. The PAYMENT parameter corresponds to the 
monetary compensation P in the discrete choice random utility model. Ten different 
levels of incentive values were randomly assigned to farmers in each of the two census 
agricultural regions. It was expected that with higher incentive payments, the 
probability the landowner would be willing to adopt the conservation plan will also 
increase. This is because landowners will try to maximize their utility according to 
utility maximization theory as discussed in section 4.3.2.3. Higher incentive payment 
is important in helping reduce landowners’ unexpected production risk, compensate for 
their opportunity costs of the wetland and riparian area and thus improve the utility. 
Therefore, landowners receiving a higher compensation amount are considered to be 
more likely to accept the offer.  
 The three Farm variables included in the model are intended to measure the 
influence of regional factors and land use patterns on landowners’ decision. Soil zone 
variable (SOIL) was created to account for any regional differences of the two study 
sites that are not captured by other explanatory variables. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
there are biophysical differences between the two sites. This variable will capture the 
effect of soil fertility, vegetation, precipitation and temperature differences.  
 The type of the farm operation (GRAIN) is included in the model since it was 
expected that farming operation type plays an important role in determining 
landowner’s decision. It was expected that farms with a higher proportion of crops 
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would require more compensation compared to farms with more livestock. When the 
economic viability of the farm relies heavily on grain, they will be more cautious in 
examining the program and determine the payment amount because the decision will 
have a large impact of their cropping production output and revenue.  
 Total farm area (ACRES) represents the area of farm managed. Farm size was 
incorporated in the analysis because of its association with fixed adoption costs, labor 
availability and management model (Feder, et al. 1985). The size of the farm 
determines the farm’s ability to achieve economies of scale in production, to earn 
greater gross income, to raise external financial capital and to bear the impact of 
volatile market price on their agricultural products. In addition, with the adoption of a 
conservation program, the land distribution will change, so does the type of field 
operation. Wetlands as field obstructions may have a different impact on smaller farms 
that use smaller equipment compared to and larger farms and therefore the net return 
received by landowners. 
 
Landowners’ preference in regard to wetland and riparian area issues was 
taken into account in this study to capture the influence of landowners’ opinion and 
perception towards the value of wetlands on the adoption decision. All respondents 
were asked to express their level of agreement with various statements concerning 
wetlands on their private land. PESTS, COSTLY and EQUIP are three variables that 
represent landowners’ attitudes towards the potential disadvantages of wetlands. If the 
landowners find that the existence of wetland would bring undesirable types and 
amount of pests that harm crops or cattle to their farm areas, it is expected that they 
would be less likely to accept the conservation program. Similarly, when the 
landowners consider the wetland too costly and difficult to be maintained, they will 
hesitate to say yes to the offer or will require greater levels of compensation payment. 
In contrast, AESTHETIC, EROSION and WILDLIFE enable landowners’ to express 
their opinion on the beneficial aspects of wetlands. If the landowners consider wetland 
cover in the region to enhance the visual appeal of the landscape, believe that wetlands 
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control soil erosion and play an important role for wildlife, it is assumed that the 
probability that they will agree to adopt the program increases. BENEFIT is intended 
to capture landowners’ view of values of wetlands and riparian areas. It is expected 
that BENEFIT contributes positively to the adoption of conservation practices.  
 
 Previous participation in environmental conservation was also expected to 
influence the landowners’ decision making process. Landowners involved in 
environment-friendly practices or behavior in the past were considered to be more 
likely to adopt similar measures due to their preference for the environment or the 
additional knowledge benefit gained from such programs. PERM and SEASON will be 
positive if landowners already practice some form of riparian and/or wetland 
conservation on the landscape. The presence of these preferences was thought to have 
a positive effect on the probability of accepting the payment. Previous adoption of a 
defined farm management plan (MNGTPL) is included to examine if a landowner with 
a management plan will be more willing to accept the program offer as the plan will 
enable landowners to manage their farm based on a long-term planning horizon. In 
contrast, the DRAINED variable is included to help understand whether landowners 
with wetland draining experience would be more or less likely to adopt the 
conservation program.  
 
 The AGE variable is included to capture the differences between younger and 
older landowners including the working status and future income perception of the 
respondents. It is expected that the age of the farm manager will influence the decision 
to participate in the program. Land with wetland easements or contracts will sell for 
less due to the reduced flexibility for the buyer regarding land use. Since older 
landowners may be more concerned with maximizing the selling price of land, they 
may choose to refuse the program offer. On the other hand, older landowners may be 
more prone to adopt the program because of reduced workloads and stable annual 
income (Shaikh et al. 2007).   
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 Level of education attainment (EDUC) is included to examine if there is a 
correlation between formal education level and landowners’ conservation adoption 
decisions. According to previously published research, education does not have a 
strong impact on landowners’ adoption decisions (Kingsbury and Boggess, 1999, 
Upadhyay et al. 2002; Gedikoglu and McCann, 2007).  
 Landowners’ off-farm income is represented by the OFFINC variable. It is 
included in the model to investigate if landowners with an off-farm income would rely 
less on the revenue from farming production and devote less time to farm management. 
The length of time that landowners act as decision makers on the farm (MNGTM) is 
included in the model to examine how management horizons are correlated with 
landowners’ farming experience and farming management capability. The variable 
HEIR reflects whether the landowner will change the conservation adoption decision if 
he/she has children or relatives to take over the farm management when he/she retires. 
This would be helpful to understand if the landowners’ decision is affected by the 
length of farmland ownership and their perspective for future plans.   
5.3.3 Regression Descriptive Statistics 
 The descriptive statistics are for the entire data and include all three groups of 
respondents. This analysis was completed in SPSS v.16. t-statistics were ran on the 
continuous variables to compare the differences between willing and unwilling 
landowners while chi square statistics were ran for discrete choices variables, both 
using a 5 percent level of significance (Table 5.5). If the difference between the 
variable means is significant at the 95 percent level, the variable is anticipated to be 
significant in the following probit model, as the different values of this variable is 
more likely to result in different responses.  
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Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Unit 
All respondents Yes responses No responses N/A Responses 
(N=212) (N=89) (N=38) (N=85) 
Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D. Mean Std. D Mean Std. D.
PAYMENT* $ 30.48 14.59 32.58 14.37 25.58 14.65 28.67 14.00
Farm 
SOIL (1,2) 1.74 0.441 1.65 0.48 1.81 0.40 1.82 0.39 
GRAIN % 78.4% 33.5% 75.6% 35.2% 89.4% 21.5% 80.9% 31.7%
ACRES acres 718 677 684 638 917 890 693 521 
Wetland Preference 
PESTS (-1,0,1) -0.17 0.76 -0.29 0.82 -0.15 0.73 -0.13 0.76 
AESTHETIC* (-1,0,1) 0.37 0.73 0.45 0.73 0.31 0.74 0.29 0.76 
EROSION (-1,0,1) 0.66 0.60 0.82 0.43 0.58 0.70 0.67 0.56 
COSTLY (-1,0,1) -0.16 0.73 -0.18 0.74 0.12 0.59 -0.29 0.70 
WILDLIFE (-1,0,1) 0.80 0.46 0.85 0.44 0.88 0.33 0.78 0.47 
EQUIP* (-1,0,1) 0.25 0.76 0.20 0.75 0.54 0.71 0.18 0.81 
BENEFIT* (-1,0,1) 0.37 0.68 0.53 0.53 0.00 0.80 0.33 0.67 
Past Experience 
DRAINED (0,1) 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.42 0.50 0.22 0.42 
PERM* (0,1) 0.56 0.50 0.68 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.49 0.50 
SEASON* (0,1) 0.40 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.08 0.27 0.38 0.49 
MNGTPL (0,1) 0.60 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.65 0.49 0.53 0.51 
Demographic &Sociological 
AGE years 53.24 13.04 54.98 10.77 53.08 13.46 53.67 12.38
EDUC (1-5) 2.49 1.03 2.64 1.06 2.77 1.14 2.29 0.87 
OFFINC  (0,1) 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.51 
MNGTM years 27.8 14.5 28.79 13.23 27.04 13.52 27.53 15.39
HEIR (0,1) 0.93 0.87 1.05 0.87 0.96 0.87 0.84 0.93 
* Significant at P<0.05 
Source: Original data obtained from a survey of Saskatchewan landowners  
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  Based on the results, the average compensation required to enable respondents 
to conserve wetlands is $30.48. The average payment for landowners who said “yes” is 
higher ($32.58) than those who said “no” ($25.58). For CAR 8B, the mean WTA value 
is $31.25 and for CAR 3AN the mean WTA value is $28.82, which is consistent with 
expectation and the differences in means are statistically significant. In order to 
evaluate the representative of the WTA value obtained, land rental values within those 
landscapes were assumed to represent the opportunity cost of retiring wetland. By 
comparing with the land rental values, it is encouraging that these WTA values are 
within the distribution of actual land rent in those two study areas (Table 5.6) and 
serves as an indicator of landowners’ perceived cost of wetland conservation.  
 
Table 5.6 Opportunity cost of retiring wetland 
CAR Rental Ratesa 
 Minimum 
($/acre) 
Maximum 
($/acre) 
Mean 
($/acre) 
8B 10.00 47.98 30.84 
3AN 19.99 34.98 25.00 
a SAF (2006) 
 
The mean for variable PERM and SEASON are found to be significantly 
different between willing and unwilling landowners indicating that landowners willing 
to conserve wetlands and riparian areas have more of their current land allocated to 
such lands compared to those unwilling to conserve. Statistical differences also exist in 
the wetland preference variables even though the differences in the mean for these 
variables are small between the two groups of landowners. For example, landowners 
willing to conserve wetlands tend to be more likely to agree with the statements that 
the benefits of wetlands exceed their disadvantages. However, the results revealed no 
significant differences between landowners with different demographic and 
sociological characteristics. The next section will present the results of the estimated 
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model and further explore the relationship between landowners’ and farm’s 
characteristics (explanatory variables) and willing to accept program decision 
(dependent variable). 
5.4 Results and Discussion 
5.4.1 Introduction to the Model   
 The analysis was based on probit regression models using the statistics 
software STATA v.9.2. For the purpose of this study, the null hypothesis is that the 
particular coefficient estimator is equal to zero given the rest of the variables in the 
model, while the alternative hypothesis is that the coefficient is not zero. The 
procedure of selecting explanatory variables for the regression models was discussed 
in section 5.3.2. Both binary and multinomial regression models were estimated. To 
evaluate the effectiveness of the models, z-statistics were used to determine the 
significance of individual coefficient estimators in the models. The z-statistic 
represents the ratio of the coefficient to the standard error of explanatory variables and 
follows a standard normal distribution to test alternative hypotheses about the 
coefficient (UCLA Academic Technology Services, 2008).  
The estimated coefficients in the non-linear regression models such as probit 
or logit model require some specific explanation to effectively interpret the results. In 
linear models, coefficients can be interpreted as marginal effects. However in 
non-linear regression models, this interpretation is complicated by the fact that the 
usual coefficient estimates are not the marginal effects that we are accustomed to and 
do not have a direct economic interpretation (Greene, 2003; Anderson and Newell, 
2003; Shaikh et al, 2007). As a result, the coefficients must be manipulated in order to 
explore the changes in the predicted probability of adoption associated with a one unit 
change in the explanatory variables while holding the rest of the variables constant. 
Marginal effects for a continuous variable is represented by its slope, assessed at the 
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sample mean. For a dummy variable, the marginal effect is calculated based on the 
sample means of all the other variables in the model9. Due to these characteristics, an 
additional “marginal effect” value was calculated in this study and is provided in the 
results section. Estimated coefficients are also presented in order to indicate the 
direction of the effect of a change in the explanatory variable. Marginal effects 
discussion in the exploration for participation decisions can also be found in similar 
research applications (Lynch et al. 2002; Shaikh et al. 2007; Kline et al. 2000). 
5.4.2 Model Results 
Both binary probit and multinomial probit were ran using the survey data set. 
However, not all returned questionnaires were applied in the probit estimation due to 
the problem of missing values. Only those surveys for which none of the response and 
predictor variables were missing have been used as observations for the regression 
models. Therefore, 92 observations were used to estimate the binary probit model and 
137 were used to estimate the multinomial probit model for WTA respectively (Table 
5.6 and 5.7). In the multinomial model, the value of the “no” response was selected as 
the base category for the estimation, which is used to specify the outcome to normalize 
the location of the latent variable. The coefficients for the base category were set to 
zero and the coefficients of the other two response groups were used to estimate the 
utility difference from the base outcome.   
 
 
 
                                                        
9 Marginal Effects for a continuous variable is equal to [ ] ββ )'(/| xfxxyE =∂∂ where f is the corresponding 
probability density function. For the Probit model, f is given byφ , the standard normal density function. Marginal 
Effects for a dummy variable is [ ] [ ] [ ]0,|1Pr1,|1Pr/| ==−===∂∂ dumxydumxydumdumyE , 
where dum represents the estimated parameters for the dummy variable and x denotes all the other variables 
evaluated at their sample means. Details see Greene (2003, P.667). 
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Table 5.7 Coefficient estimates for binary probit model 
Variables Coefficient Marginal Effects Std. Error 
Constant -3.450 -- 2.756 
PAYMENT 0.045** 0.006 0.021 
Farm    
SOIL -0.410 -0.055 0.653 
GRAIN -0.212 -0.028 0.958 
ACRES -0.001* -0.0001 0.000 
Wetland Preference    
PESTS 1.120** 0.149 0.472 
AESTHETIC -1.295** -0.173 0.545 
EROSION 1.747* 0.233 0.905 
COSTLY -0.548 -0.073 0.478 
WILDLIFE -1.965 -0.262 1.194 
EQUIP -0.975* -0.130 0.511 
BENEFIT 1.220* 0.163 0.627 
Past Experience    
DRAINED 1.257** 0.152 0.626 
PERM 1.944** 0.341 0.707 
SEASON 2.969** 0.351 1.053 
MNGTPL 1.135* 0.194 0.592 
Demographic &Sociological 
AGE 0.049 0.007 0.045 
EDUC -0.162 -0.022 0.277 
OFFINC  0.273 0.037 0.543 
MNGTM -0.077* -0.010 0.045 
HEIR 0.990** 0.132 0.375 
No. of observations = 92 
Log likelihood = -24.537 
Likelihood ratio 2χ (df) = 60.48 (20) 
McFadden R2 = 0.5521 
a Huber/ White robust standard errors. 
* Indicates significance at 10% level or better. **Indicates significance at 5% level or better. 
 95 
Table 5.8 Coefficient estimates for multinomial probit model a 
 Response 
 Yes N/A 
Variables Coeff. Mar. Eff. Std. Err.b Coeff. Mar. Eff. Std. Err.b
PAYMENT 0.031* 0.008 0.018 -0.025* -0.006 0.014 
Farm       
SOIL -0.465 -0.225 0.630 0.835* 0.215 0.482 
GRAIN -0.863 -0.124 0.941 0.308 0.047 0.627 
ACRES -0.001* -0.0002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Wetland Preference       
PESTS 0.845** 0.026 0.418 0.103 0.069 0.279 
AESTHETIC -1.086** -0.121 0.482 0.240 0.017 0.354 
EROSION 0.535 0.170 0.596 -0.583 -0.141 0.450 
COSTLY -0.028 -0.133 0.437 -0.570* -0.163 0.340 
WILDLIFE -1.594** -0.124 0.768 0.122 0.040 0.459 
EQUIP -0.747* -0.091 0.428 0.198 0.021 0.294 
BENEFIT 1.931** 0.310 0.629 -0.825* -0.144 0.482 
Past Experience       
DRAINED 1.492** 0.418 0.642 -1.550** -0.342 0.509 
PERM 1.555** 0.250 0.632 -0.664 -0.105 0.549 
SEASON 2.558** 0.185 0.873 -0.238 -0.036 0.524 
MNGTPL 0.895 0.211 0.545 -0.667 -0.144 0.415 
Demographic &Sociological 
AGE 0.053 0.019 0.040 -0.066** -0.016 0.032 
EDUC -0.383 -0.045 0.283 -0.285 -0.099 0.205 
OFFINC  0.366 0.064 0.507 -0.176 -0.033 0.399 
MNGTM -0.059* -0.012 0.035 0.036 0.008 0.026 
HEIR 0.602* 0.110 0.329 -0.313 -0.061 0.220 
No. of observations = 137 
Log likelihood = -141.5099 
Wald 2χ (df) = 47.68 (40) 
McFadden R2 = 0.3012 
a WTA=0 is the base outcome 
b Huber/ White robust standard errors. 
* Indicates significance at 10% level or better. **Indicates significance at 5% level or better. 
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One way to examine the performance of the estimated model is using the 
correctly predicted probability, a hundred percent-based numerical value. If the 
predicted response calculated by the model is agreed with the real response provided 
by the landowner, this response is considered to be correctly predicted. For the current 
research, both models correctly predict over 60 percent of the “yes” and “no” 
responses, with binary probit model doing a little better correctly predicting 80.8 
percent of the “no” responses and 94 percent of the “yes” responses. The multinomial 
probit model correctly predicts 60 percent of the “no” responses, 84.6 percent of the 
“yes” responses and 55.6 percent of the N/A responses. This finding shows a 
reasonable prediction ability of the model and is comparable to similar research that 
has applied the probit model (Lynch et al. 2002; Davey, 2006). Collinearity among the 
variables was also checked using STATA v.9.2 (See Appendix B). No serious 
systematic problem with collinearity among variables was found10.  
As hypothesized, in both models a statistically significant, positive 
relationship is found between the magnitude of the offered payment and the probability 
that landowners are willing to adopt the wetland conservation program on their lands. 
A marginal increase in the payment ($1/year) corresponds to an increase in the 
probability of acceptance of the payment ranging from 0.6 percent for the binary probit 
model to 0.8 percent for the multinomial probit model, as revealed by the marginal 
value.  
Within the Farm variables, ACRES which represent each farm’s total area is 
the only variable statistically significant. A negative relationship in the model indicates 
that landowners who manage less land would be more willing to adopt the 
conservation activities. This may be the result of highly variable agricultural 
commodity prices which brings higher pressure and risks to small farms. Accepting a 
fixed annual payment may be one way for these landowners to secure some income. 
Further, as land use varies landowners must change their field operations. For smaller 
farms, equipment is smaller resulting in the cost of field obstruction often being lower 
                                                        
10 Correlations are less than 0.5 in most cases therefore there is no serious collinearity problem among variables. 
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than on large farms. This conclusion is supported by the EQUIP coefficient indicating 
that if landowners believe that wetlands are hard to maneuver around with farm 
equipment they are less likely to accept the WTA bid. However, even though the 
relationship is significant, the real marginal effect of this independent variable on the 
probability of a “yes” response to the bid is relatively minor, ranging from 1 percent to 
2 percent per 100 acres (per 40.5 ha) change in farm size.  
SOIL and GRAIN are two explanatory variables that were added to the model 
after the backward selection process. They were included due to a significant impact of 
land location and production type on landowners’ participation in land conservation 
programs being reported in previous published literature (Shaikh et al. 2007; Hua, et al 
2004; Ferguson, 2005; Lambert et al. 2003). Although the estimated coefficients of 
these variables were not significant at the 10 percent level in the current study models, 
the impacts might still exist but the probability is not high enough to have confidence 
in (Ferguson, 2005). For the SOIL variable, a negative sign is found in both models 
implying that landowners in dark brown/black soil zone (CAR 8B) are more hesitant to 
conserve wetlands and may require greater compensation payment. CAR 8B is 
characterized with greater levels of precipitation and lower evaporation resulting in 
wetter soil than CAR 3AN. Although landowners in CAR 8B may consider the 
conservation program itself as an acceptable offer, they may be hesitant when asked to 
bring more wet areas into the landscape as they already receive sufficient precipitation 
during the growing season. In addition, many landowners have spent considerable time 
and money clearing wetlands and riparian trees, they are likely to demand higher 
incentive payment to compensate for their effort to reinstall these areas (van Kooten et 
al. 2002). In contrast, landowners in CAR 3AN have a drier landscape and providing 
wetlands in the landscape may help them mitigate water access issues to some extent. 
For the GRAIN variable, the negative relationship indicates that landowners who agree 
to conserve wetlands and riparian areas are less likely to depend on cropping as their 
primary operation type. In other words, those landowners who agree to conserve 
wetlands have more of their land allocated to perennial cover such as hay and pasture 
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and therefore likely gain some of their income from livestock resulting in a lower 
opportunity cost imposed by wetlands on the land. 
 
Many previous studies have examined the relationship between landowners’ 
environmental perceptions and conservation practice adoption decisions. However in 
this research, the correlation is somewhat ambiguous with both positive and negative 
relationships found for a particular opinion (Hua, et al 2004; Cuddington, 2008; 
Kingsbury and Boggess, 1999). In the current study, both models found that 
landowners who agree with the concept that wetlands and riparian zones are important 
for erosion control (EROSION) are more likely to accept the program and conserve 
wetlands. Similar results were found for the BENEFIT variable. Specifically for those 
who believe that the benefits of wetlands outweigh their disadvantages, their 
probability to accept the offer is 16 percent higher at the margin in the binary probit 
model and 31 percent higher in multinomial model. COSTLY is one of the six added 
variables. Although it is not statistically significant in either model, its negative 
relationship implies that landowners would not be willing to conserve wetlands if they 
deem wetlands and riparian areas are costly to maintain in the landscape. Surprisingly, 
the coefficients for the opinion variables PESTS, AESTHETIC and WILDLIFE in both 
models are not consistent with expectations. The negative coefficient for the PESTS 
variable indicates that although landowners felt that wetlands might harbor undesired 
pests, they were still willing to accept the conservation payment. The negative 
coefficient of visual variable AESTHETIC implies that the landowner still may adopt 
conservation activity though he considers wetlands as visually unappealing. A similar 
conclusion was found for the WILDLIFE parameter, respondents that believe wetlands 
are important for wildlife but they still would not choose to accept the program. 
 
A strong correlation is found in both models between past experience and 
landowners’ decision to participate in the program. Landowners that already maintain 
wetlands and riparian areas on their landscapes are more willing to adopt the 
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conservation management than those who do not have such experience, which signifies 
a consistent environmental preference. This could be reflected by the two variables 
PERM and SEASON which are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. This result indicates that landowners who already have greater areas of their land 
allocated to wetlands are more likely to comply with the wetland conservation program. 
Management plan variable (MNGTPL) turned out to be statistically insignificant in the 
multinomial probit model but significant at the 10 percent level in the binary probit 
model. This is probably due to the fact that a certain number of landowners, who did 
not complete the WTA question, do not have a defined management plan. The positive 
sign in both models suggests that landowners who have previously adopted a farm 
management plan were more likely to accept the program payment. The past draining 
experience variable (DRAINED) behaves contrary to expectations. Both models 
indicate that landowners who used to drain wetlands or riparian zones within last ten 
years are more likely to be willing to conserve wetlands. One possible explanation for 
this is the impact of the high conversion costs and the small stock of wetlands the 
landowner has on his land. If a landowner already drained many wetlands in the past, it 
would be quite costly for him to convert the remaining wetlands to cropland compared 
to leaving them as they are. Therefore these landowners would be more likely to accept 
the conservation management plan since they will maintain them as wetlands anyway. 
Further discussion will be presented in following sections.  
 
The decision to participate in the wetland conservation program is also 
considered to be somewhat affected by demographic and sociological factors. However, 
for the AGE variable, other empirical studies have reported both positive (Shaikh et al. 
2007; Kline et al. 2000; Amigues et al. 2002) and negative (Kingsbury and Boggess, 
1999; Gedikoglu and McCann, 2007; Lynch et al. 2002) relationships between age and 
participation. The result in the present study suggests that older landowners are more 
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likely to adopt the conservation program, but the relationship is not significant. The 
previously published research has also shown that the relationship between education 
level (EDUC) and participation is uncertain (Kingsbury and Boggess, 1999, Upadhyay 
et al. 2002; Gedikoglu and McCann, 2007). In this study both models show an 
insignificant negative relationship between education and participation.  
Off-farm income (OFFINC) is positively correlated with the decision to adopt 
wetland and riparian conservation indicating that landowners with more off-farm 
income would be more likely to adopt conservation management. The reason for this 
relationship is uncertain although those farmers with off-farm income may have 
different objectives for their land and different time constraints than farmers who 
depend on their land for all of their income. The conservation management with 
payment may fit better with the management practices of this group of farmers. The 
insignificant sign in this case might be due to the insufficient off-farm employment 
opportunities in the study areas.   
The proxy management time variable (MNGTM) is used to measure the 
impact of farming experience on the conservation adoption decision. Based on 
previous findings, the direct relationship with participation in conservation program is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, landowners with more farming experience compared to 
newer farmers allows them to know more wetland benefits for the land and accept the 
offer. On the other hand, it is also possible they are more reluctant to make a major 
change to the current land allocation and prefer to keep the status quo land allocation. 
This research found a negative and significant coefficient at the 10 percent significance 
level suggesting that landowners with more years farming experience prefer to 
maintain current land use and rely on their income from farming production. However, 
the effect of an additional year in managing the farm corresponds to only a small 
decrease in the likelihood (around 1 percent) that the respondent accept the offer.  
Everything else equal, landowners who intend to leave the farm to a relative 
or child (HEIR) are more likely to adopt the conservation management. The significant 
sign in both models suggests that continuation of the family farm influences 
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landowners’ decisions. This is probably because landowners are making decisions on 
what is best for the farmland for a long-term period of time rather than the short-run 
benefits. Some benefits provided by wetlands could only be realized in the long-term 
such as flood control and erosion mitigation and thus are more suitable for farms with 
long planning horizons. It is assumed that keeping the land in a much healthier 
condition at the current stage would help improve productivity for future production 
and increase the potential land sales value.  
  
As expected, the results from the binary probit model and the results from the 
“yes” responses of the multinomial model were quite similar. The binary probit model 
estimated thirteen significant variables while the multinomial model estimated twelve, 
with ten of the significant variables consistent across both models. Besides these 
estimation results, it is also worthwhile to highlight the factors that may have 
influenced the response of those landowners who did not complete the WTA question. 
These results provide insight into the reasons why landowners would not respond to 
the WTA question. According to the estimation results from the multinomial model, six 
variables had a significant impact, they are PAYMENT, SOIL, COSTLY, BENEFIT, 
DRAINED and AGE. These results indicate that landowners who are younger, living 
in CAR 8B area, who haven’t drained in the last ten years, who believe that the 
disadvantages of wetland outweigh their benefits but are not costly to be maintained 
are more likely not to respond to the WTA question. Payment amount is also found to 
have negative impact indicating that the lower bid value landowners receive, the more 
likely they did not respond. Based on the above findings, it is of interest to note that 
payment amount is absolutely the factor landowners will consider when making the 
participation decision, but as indicated by the marginal effects of payment (0.6 percent) 
and cost variable (16.3 percent), it seems that this is not the most significant factor 
affecting their completion of the WTA question. Based on the responses, it is more 
likely that limited information of the program and benefits of maintaining wetland in 
the landscape may influence these non-responses. As indicated by the opposite sign of 
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variable DRAINED in yes and N/A responses model, landowners with previous 
drainage experience are more willing to conserve wetlands. For landowners who don’t 
have previous drainage experience, the probability they do not respond to the WTA 
question is 34.2 percent higher than those with. This may be due to the knowledge they 
obtained from their drainage experience such as the impact on soil conditions and 
wetlands functions and benefits from wetland retention, which provide more 
motivation for them to protect in the future. In contrast, respondents without such 
experience do not have an opportunity to learn such information and are, therefore, 
less likely to respond. Further, the age variable indicates that older landowners with 
more wetland management and farming experience would be more likely to answer the 
question directly; however, this marginal effect is not very strong (1.6 percent). 
Attitude about wetlands and riparian areas (benefit<disadvantage) is significant at a 10 
percent level indicating that some landowners do not reply because they personally 
dislike wetlands or they are not well informed about their benefits. The SOIL dummy 
variable is also a factor influencing the responses especially for those who live in a 
much wetter place in a much wetter year. This group of respondents might have 
specific responses if the survey was not conducted in a flood year but it is not possible 
to support this suggestion with existing data.  
5.4.3 Discussion 
5.4.3.1 Payment Variables 
Landowners’ decision to participate in the wetland conservation program is 
affected by a combination of factors. However, the monetary incentive is one of the 
most important factors landowners consider in the decision process. Both models 
indicated that the probability of agreeing to conserve wetlands on their land increases 
with the level of incentive payment. The average payment required by respondents in 
CAR 8B is about $31/acre ($76.6/ha) and by respondents in CAR 3AN is around 
$28.8/acre ($71.2/ha) which is relatively similar to the land rental rates within the two 
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study areas respectively ($30.9 in 8B and $25 in 3AN).  
Agricultural income has a history of being highly variable and it is possible 
that the financial incentives available from the wetland conservation program provide 
a less risky way for landowners to maintain income while enjoying the environmental 
benefits, which may enhance sustainable agricultural production in the future. For a 
government policy to reach a cost-effective goal of an economic incentive program, 
WTA would be a more appropriate way to determine payment amounts. According to 
Shaikh et al. (2007), this could effectively save between one-third and two-thirds of the 
policy implementation costs since landowners already receive other benefits such as 
reduced risk and environmental benefits or they might find an inherent value in 
wetlands (Cuddington, 2008).  
For those respondents who did not complete the WTA question, the mean 
financial incentive amount was approximately $28/acre ($69.2/ha) which is the middle 
value among three mean compensation values. Combining this with the results from 
multinomial probit model, it is apparent that at this incentive level landowners are 
quite unsure about whether a yes or no answer should be presented. They might need 
more time to do the comparison, need extra help to get more information regarding the 
program, or need to take other factors into consideration in their final decision. 
Therefore, when completing the survey, they choose not to response to the question to 
indicate their uncertainty. This postulation is confirmed by some landowners’ 
comments indicating that they do not respond because farming status will change in 
the near future even though they recognize the social benefits of wetland, and by 
information from other questions in the survey indicating that some landowners do not 
participate in an environmental program because of unfamiliarity with such a program.      
5.4.3.2 Farm Variables 
Farm variables do not seem to play a critical role in landowners’ decisions as 
indicated by the insignificance of the coefficients and marginal effects in both models. 
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The only significant variable identified by the model was farm size (ACRES). 
However, the model indicates that the influence of this variable was relatively small.    
The significant coefficient for the SOIL variable in the N/A response model 
may help explain one of the concerns landowners in CAR 8B might have about 
conserving wetlands in the agricultural landscape, beside the factor of financial 
incentive. In the brown soil zone (3AN) landowners who experience lack of moisture 
may be more willing to accept the presence of wetlands, perhaps as a reserve for soil 
moisture. However, in the dark brown or black soil zone (8B), landowners’ willingness 
to accept is discouraged, for example, by having to deal with too much soil moisture at 
times or too many wetlands. Since landowners in 8B experienced a flooding year when 
the survey was conducted, their willingness to keep wetland, in the field might be 
diminished. Thus future farm survey research may be needed to determine if the same 
results hold true in other years with different climate conditions. 
5.4.3.3Landowners Preference Variables 
Preferences for wetlands are regarded to be positively correlated with 
landowners’ adoption behavior. However, according to Cary and Wilkinson (1997), 
environmental preference will not translate to consistent environment-friendly action 
unless there are economical or other benefits associated with the behavior. In our case, 
three opinion variables (PESTS, AESTHETIC and WILDLIFE) are significant within 
the model suggesting that respondents still would like to accept the program offer even 
though they consider that wetlands harbor unexpected pests, may not be pleasant to 
view and not considered to be important for wildlife. Alternatively, there are also 
several attitude variables that are consistent to the expectation and significant. The 
results of EROISION, EQIP and BENEFIT indicate that the program may be accepted 
because landowners believe that wetlands provide erosion control function, not 
difficult to manage and offer more benefits than disadvantages. This is an important 
finding as it implies that respondents’ answers are influenced by those practical and 
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private benefits of wetland. The ease of management and wetland’s actual function for 
the farmland is far more significant than visual and preference influence. This result 
suggests that landowners are unlikely to support programs that require increased field 
work or require greater management time. According to Gelso et al. (2008), increasing 
wetland dispersion contributes significant inconvenience cost to landowners. Based on 
these findings, a conservation policy such as targeting at farms with lower dispersed 
wetland or allowing landowners with flexibility to redistribute wetlands in the field 
without changing wetland acres may be more acceptable and will be adopted by 
landowners11. Although restoration costs incurred by the redistribution of wetlands can 
be quite high, this can be justified if operation costs are significantly less than the 
inconvenience costs (Gelso et al. 2008). The negative sign of WILDLIFE could be 
explained as either landowners’ limited information of wetland functions or their 
personal aversion to the presence of ducks and geese, which can impose costs through 
crop depredation, on their private land. 
5.4.3.4 Past Experience Variables 
Past experience with wetland management, supported by both models, shows 
a significant influence on landowners’ conservation adoption decision even it is 
wetland drainage experience. This is an interesting finding and one suggested 
implication is that landowner who had drainage experience in the past maintaining 
remaining wetlands in the landscape, would take the offer bid as it would be more 
acceptable and economical since the conversion costs are high. Another implication 
might be that previous knowledge about wetland and riparian area would be an 
important factor to encourage landowners to conserve them. As with previous 
experience, it would be obvious for landowners to compare the land status and find out 
the site difference before and after conserving or draining the wetland as discussed in 
section 5.4.2. These landowners may incur lower learning costs and related 
                                                        
11 However, a single permanent wetland may not provide the same range of environmental goods as more dispersed 
wetlands of different size and permanence. But this policy may work as a second best solution to keep the wetland 
in the landscape. 
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information costs of wetland advantages, buffer installation and government support 
programs etc. (Lynch et al. 2002). Therefore, it is easier for these farmers to recognize 
the overall benefits and disadvantages of maintaining wetland and riparian zones.  
Combining the relationship between past experience and landowners’ 
conservation adoption with the result of significant variables BENEFIT and 
DRAINED in the N/A response model may further support the above conclusion. The 
negative signs of these two variables indicate that those who did not answer the WTA 
question are those landowners who have limited experience with managing land that 
includes wetland, and less knowledge about the benefits of wetlands and riparian areas. 
Based on these findings, a well defined economic incentive program is anticipated to 
yield higher level of benefits if working in conjunction with an education program to 
reduce certain amount of transaction costs imposed during implementation. 
5.4.3.5 Demographic and Sociological Variables 
The results from the demographic and sociological variables suggest that 
landowners’ farm management experience and the existence of an heir to take over 
their farm business are two significant influences landowners consider to adopt 
wetland conservation activities. The age of the landowners, however, does not seem to 
influence the landowners’ decisions. This is probably because heir and age variables 
are representing similar characteristics and the impact of age is weakened by the 
presence of the heir variable, since the landowners’ decision will be more likely 
affected by the existence of an heir rather than their age. For example, if a landowner 
is 70-years old and he has no heir to take over the farm when he retires, it is hard to 
predict whether he will accept the conservation plan or not since he might want to 
exploit the land as much as possible and refuse the offer, or, he might want to reduce 
the workload and accept the offer. But if the landowner has an heir, it is very likely that 
he would accept the offer since the landowner will consider the farmland from a 
long-term perspective. Thus, wetland policy may be more effective if targeted to 
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producers either with an heir to take over the farm when they retire or those having a 
management plan to achieve long-term benefits. 
In contrast to the above discussion in the N/A response model, age was 
revealed to have a significant impact implying that young landowners are more likely 
not to complete the WTA question. The probable reason for this is that young 
landowners have longer farming planning horizons and there is no need for them to 
consider the heir problem. Therefore, the impact of heir variable is reduced. Young 
landowners are also characterized by less farming and management experience which 
further increases the uncertainty during their decision making process. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter examines the use of incentive-based policy to encourage 
landowners to conserve wetlands and riparian zones in their agricultural landscape. 
Farm and landowners’ characteristics have been assessed to evaluate their influence on 
the magnitude of economic incentive needed. Both binary probit and multinomial 
probit model were run using the survey data collected from the two designated study 
sites. Results from the two models did not differ significantly in either significant 
variables or their ability to correctly predict variables. According to the results, 
landowners’ decisions are mainly affected by the magnitude of the payment, 
landowners’ attitude towards wetlands and riparian areas, and their previous wetland 
management experience. Farm characteristics and demographic factors of landowners 
only had a limited influence. For those landowners who did not answer the WTA 
question, the N/A response model shows that whether the landowner had previous 
wetland draining experience could play a significant and decisive role. The next 
chapter will conclude the thesis by briefly synthesizing the survey and model results 
and discussing the limitation and recommendation for further relevant study. 
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CHAPTER 6  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the major findings 
from the analysis and results sections of this thesis. First a summary of the research 
findings from theoretical framework, the landowners’ survey and the key results of the 
analysis are provided. This is followed by a discussion of policy implication from the 
empirical work. Finally, the primary study limitations are discussed, along with 
recommendation for future research.  
6.2 Summary 
Wetlands provide a wide variety of habitat types and, together with associated 
riparian zones, produce important resource outputs to society. The literature explored 
in Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of wetland and riparian zones in an ecological 
system, their current status and existing threats to their structure and function. Given 
the public good characteristics of many of the goods and services provided by wetland 
and riparian areas, government participation is considered to be critical to achieve 
wetland conservation goals. Although many policy measures have been applied to 
protect wetlands, there is still a long way to go to develop a comprehensive wetland 
policy. Specifically in the province of Saskatchewan, it appears that few instruments 
are dedicated to ensure wetlands are conserved within privately-owned farmland. 
Economic valuation plays a role in assisting wetland management and 
informing policy development through the process of estimating the value to society of 
wetland and riparian zones. It acts to capture the economic values of benefits wetlands 
provide and to support the wise use of wetland resources. As many goods and services 
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wetlands provide cannot be normally traded on open markets, non-market valuation 
approaches are desired to complete an economic valuation process.  
The theoretical foundation of wetland and riparian valuation is explored in 
Chapter 3. It is revealed that since many of the benefits wetlands support are 
non-marketable, they are often ignored and undervalued in development decisions. The 
failure to fully account for the value of wetlands by the current market is usually 
deemed as a major factor of wetland resource degradation and misallocation. The 
theoretical analysis conducted in Chapter 3 investigates the primary reasons valuation 
is incomplete, which could be summarized as public goods nature of wetland, poorly 
defined property rights, limited knowledge and externalities. A graphical model is then 
introduced to present the basic framework of wetland conservation and conversion 
activities, and explain why the suboptimal land allocation is caused by the market 
failure. Monetary incentives can be used as a form of government participation in 
solving the misallocation problem and achieving wetland conservation goals. 
To inform the development of appropriate policy to conserve wetland and 
riparian areas, Chapter 4 develops an analysis to quantify the cost of conserving 
wetland and riparian zones from the landowners’ perspective. Using data from a mail 
out stated preference survey to two Saskatchewan study regions, landowners’ WTA 
was estimated representing the levels of economic incentives required for landowners 
to adopt management practices that conserve wetlands and riparian areas on their 
private lands. Based on the discrete choice random utility theory, the landowners will 
only accept the offer if they receive higher utility from participating in the economic 
incentives program rather than maintaining the status quo. Besides the magnitude of 
the incentive payment, conservation program participation decisions are also 
influenced by other characteristics of the farm and landowner.  
Finally, Chapter 5 reported the results and empirical analysis of the 
Saskatchewan landowners’ survey. Rather than ignoring the results from those 
respondents’ who did not respond to the WTA question, this study develops two 
discrete choice models. The binary probit model considers only yes and no responses 
 110 
while the multinomial probit model takes the responses of the non-respondents into 
account as well. Both models have been examined due to the fact that a considerable 
proportion of the returned surveys (40 percent) did not complete the WTA question. 
This analysis helps to identify the characteristics of farmers who positively, negatively 
or did not respond to the WTA question.   
Both models produce significant coefficient estimates for the magnitude of the 
payment variable and reveal, as expected, the likelihood of agreeing to participate in 
the wetland conservation program increases with the level of incentive payment. The 
probability of a “yes” response increased by 0.6 percent to 0.8 percent with a marginal 
($1) increase in the payment rate. The average WTA compensation required by the 
respondents was $30.48/acre. Respondents willing to participate in the program 
required a higher average payment of $32.58/acre compared to the non-respondents 
group of $28.67/acre and unwilling respondents of $25.58/acre. 
As reflected by the findings from the two probit models developed, past 
experience dealing with wetlands is found to be a significant factor in predicting 
landowners’ participation in wetland conservation practices. It is important to note that 
it did not seem to matter if the previous experience with wetlands involved wetland 
conservation or wetland drainage. This result seems to highlight the importance of 
wetland knowledge in the conservation decision process. Some perceptions about the 
value of wetlands were also revealed to have an important influence on landowners’ 
decisions. However, only those opinions that were correlated with real economic 
benefits seemed to have an impact on landowners’ actions. Farm and demographic 
factors did not appear to have a significant impact on participation decisions except the 
HEIR variable (the landowner has a child or relative to take over farm management 
when they retire). The significance of the heir variable indicates that the landowner 
would be more likely to accept the program offer if the management plan is long-term. 
The 10 year wetland conservation contract that is proposed in the survey caters to the 
need of the landowner while ensuring the annual payment. The multinomial probit 
model evaluates landowners who do not complete the WTA question as well. The 
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result further confirms that past relative experience and knowledge about wetlands is 
critical for landowners to give definite answers. The result also suggests that the age of 
the farmer and the agricultural region in which the farm is located are factors that 
affect to the provision of an explicit answer. Besides the characteristic factors 
discussed above, the general comments provided by the survey respondents also 
indicated that changed personal status (e.g. retirement, farm sale, etc.) and too much 
water the year the survey was conducted are important causes of uncertainty.   
6.3 Management Implications  
6.3.1 Targeting Strategy 
  With limited public funds, policy strategy should be designed on the basis of 
the cost-effective principle and target resources which yield the greatest environmental 
amenities (Wu, et al., 1997 & 2001; Belcher, 2008). Therefore, it is unlikely that any 
one policy would be efficient for all wetland owners. For conservation purposes, 
individual landowner’s costs would range widely depending on land potential for 
future use, wetland location, difficulty and cost of conservation and so on (Heimlich et 
al, 1998). The appropriate economic incentive payment amount in Saskatchewan was 
found out to be landowners’ willingness to participate in conserving and enhancing 
wetland habitat programs. However, based on the present research, these were clearly 
not the only drivers of the landowners’ participation decision. Other factors were 
necessary to motivate higher participation rate. As suggested by this research, a policy 
that targets landowners with an heir and those who have profound wetland knowledge 
would tend to yield higher levels of participation and would, therefore, be more likely 
to produce greater environmental benefits from a given budget. These characteristics 
may offer policy makers an opportunity to achieve proposed goals through relatively 
low program costs. In addition, it should be noted that the magnitude of the WTA 
represents the minimum financial incentive landowners would require to participate. If 
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environmentally sensitive, but more productivity land, is targeted for the incentive 
program, the mean WTA payment derived from this study might not be high enough to 
encourage conservation participation (Lynch et al. 2002).  
6.3.2 Various Policy Tools 
Government intervention has been shown to be an appropriate approach, in 
certain situations, to correct market failures and to maximize social welfare. Economic 
instruments, such as the payment of financial incentives, represent one example of how 
a policy tool could be used to encourage wetland conservation practices and to 
increase public welfare. However, even though financial incentives represent a more 
flexible tool to increase ecosystem services and enrolling more land, it would be quite 
costly and ineffective if it is the only policy in use (Cuddington, 2008). In fact there 
are a host of other policies that could provide conservation payoffs. The significant 
influence of previous wetland management experience on landowners’ decision 
signifies the important role of information and knowledge. Therefore, other policies 
such as research and technological innovation may be important to complement 
economic incentive programs to achieve more effective results. Conservation 
compatible practices (such as conservation tillage, crop rotation and use of 
insect-resistant or herbicide-tolerant plants) which usually do not require large 
conversion costs nor require direct financial assistance from governments may also be 
encouraged. The increase use of such practices could benefit wetland and wildlife 
habitats by providing greater upland cover and make the wetland more productive. 
6.4 Limitation of the study  
One limitation of this study is that it does not include the landowners’ 
potential revenue from wetland conservation activities and the co-benefits that are 
provided by these activities (e.g. income from carbon trade market). As conservation 
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program payment provides a stable annual income, the prevailing payment formula is 
that the compensation payment should cover the foregone profit from production 
earnings (not development costs) (Lynch et al. 2002). If other revenue from wetland 
conservation was taken into consideration, it is possible program costs could be 
reduced further to some extent since those incomes could partially offset the 
opportunity cost of the land subject to wetland and riparian conservation. For example, 
Cuddington (2008) showed that combining the payments from the carbon market could 
decrease costs of a wetland and riparian conservation program payments by up to 20 
percent depending on the price of carbon.  
Determination of an effective economic incentive payment is confined by 
practical limitation since a relatively small number of observations and low response 
rate restricts the inference that can be drawn from the analysis. Even though the 
sample was compared to Census of Agriculture data and was broadly representative of 
landowners of the larger population, examination of surveys from about two hundred 
respondents might not be complete enough to make implication about all landowners 
in PPR. The response rate is expected to be better if not implemented during the 
harvest season. Likewise, the limitation of examining wetland conservation practices 
in two agricultural regions limits the applicability of the results. Studies could be 
conducted over different landscapes to capture the impact of various biological 
characteristics such as climate, soil productivity and precipitation. This will help 
effectively target the allocation of wetland and riparian resources. 
6.5 Future Research 
There are many opportunities for future research of policies for wetland 
conservation. Firstly, the economic incentive-based policy that the current study 
examines is a general category of policy and could be further divided into several 
subcategories such as cost-share incentive payment, land retirement program and 
environmental tax. Though all of these programs are economic incentive polices, they 
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will differ in the incentive, participation manner and impact on farms. Investigation of 
a broader scope of wetland policies could help identify and understand the differences 
and assist in delivering effective policies. 
Wetland quality determines the function and variety of ecological services 
provided and therefore requires equivalent attention when wetland conservation 
policies are established. According to Heimlich et al (1998), wetland quality is usually 
measured by its hydrologic functions, nutrient supply functions, plant community 
characteristics and dynamics and faunal community characteristics. Understanding the 
relationship between wetland quality and its functions would assist decision makers to 
better target wetlands that yield greater environment benefits with fixed budget. This 
information would also be important to landowners who are expecting greater financial 
incentives to implement environmental friendly management practice and protect 
wetlands and surrounding riparian areas, since production activities on surrounding 
vegetation might also contribute to wetland function degradation. Future research is 
needed to examine the influence of wetland quality on conservation program targeting 
strategy and the potential related costs involved.  
Lastly, wetland valuation research should be investigated from all sides of the 
wetland market. Currently, the majority of economic research has focused on 
quantifying society’s valuation of the goods and services wetlands provide from the 
demand side of the market using valuation study to estimate society’s WTP. However, 
valuation from the supply side may be much more important due to its decisive role in 
wetland quantity and quality management and thus, there should be more work to 
develop it. This research looks at the cost of supplying wetland services from the 
landowners’ perspective based on the adoption of the conservation program, which is a 
less well researched area of wetland markets. But due to limitation of data and scope, 
further research is needed for a more comprehensive picture of quantification of 
wetland non-market values.      
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